Here’s the problem with paradigm shifts: they are often associated with too many gray areas to neatly fit an analytical model. Take Euroleague centers. It could be argued that the omnipresence of pick and roll sets in a modern European offense has changed the way the position is played- size is less important than explosiveness and agility, footwork in the post has taken a backseat to defensive footwork. This is why undersized Olympiacos dominated inside against CSKA Moscow in last season’s final four. This is why Stephane Lasme won the Defensive Player of the Year award. This is why every Real Madrid opponent this season secretly hopes that Pablo Laso will keep playing Giannis Bouroussis over Marcus Slaughter (or maybe I’m just prejudiced against Bouroussis).

However, the narrative is not linear. Injuries, chemistry issues and a few good seven – footers have kept the frontcourt traditions alive. This season, CSKA find themselves in one of those gray areas: Nenad Krstic is mostly old-school: he can score with his back to the basket, but lacks the footspeed to properly defend pick and rolls. The only ‘modern’ aspect of his game is his shooting range, which extends to the long two pointer area. Kyle Hines is on the other end of the spectrum. Sasha Kaun is somewhere in between – not as polished on the low post as Krstic, but a much more effective pick and roll defender and a more explosive finisher. When Hines signed with CSKA last summer, there were a few questions about whether Ettore Messina could find enough minutes for all three. The answer was simple: with Viktor Khryapa struggling and Andrei Vorontsevich in and out of the doghouse, Hines, an emblematic figure in Euroleague’s positional revolution, has seen most of his minutes at power forward.The following screencap from their recent game at Madrid suggests that this is not a particularly good idea for CSKA’s offense:

This is a typical issue for any pick and roll offense without a stretch four (or lack of shooting in one of the three perimeter positions): at least one help defender – Mirotic in the instance – can cheat off his man and help inside (also notice Rudy’s aggressive and somewhat risky rotation toward Pargo from the strong side). CSKA have been deploying two-center lineups since last season, so they can run some pretty effective counters, taking advantage of Krstic’s mid-range productivity.

This side pick and roll starts with the Serbian center in the paint. Once Hines rolls to the basket Krstic moves at the free throw line. Reyes stays with him, as he has to honour his jumper. This leaves the two defenders guarding the pick and roll, Rudy and Mirotic in a tough place. If Mirotic hedges out, Hines has a free path to the basket; if Rudy goes under the screen he risks an open three by Vladimir Micov; and if Mirotic stays flat, with Rudy going over the screen, the former could find himself in the middle of a Hines-Micov two-man game. This why Madrid resorts to a switch, with Rudy overplaying Hines:

The only problem is that none of his teammates has his back (perhaps Llull should have rotated deeper, given the distance a potential pass to Fridzon would have to cover). Hines receives the lob pass, is fouled and goes to the free throw line. Another way for CSKA around spacing issues has been mixing pick and rolls with certain principles of the flex offense:

Weems has the ball on the top of the key. Hines is an option as a screen setter, which means that Mirotic can’t roam around. In other words, CSKA are trying a different approach to spreading the floor through their power forward. Fridzon is the one taking advantage of that space, by coming off a Krstic baseline pick and hitting the layup. This sort of offensive diversity is aesthetically pleasing as an alternative to a steady diet of pick and rolls. But it is not particularly efficient. Compared to their season average, CSKA’s production drops by nearly five points per a hundred possessions when Hines plays the four. On the other hand, with the American at center, their offense improves by nearly three points per a a hundred possessions.

Such discrepancies can be attributed to multiple factors: lack of shooting from the power forward position, an overreliance on 1-4 pick and rolls which allow opponents to keep their slow footed centers out of harm’s way and an emphasis on post up actions for Krstic or Kaun, which are unlikely to be the most efficient option in Messina’s playbook – or most playbooks for that matter. But a bigger problem is how underused Hines has been this season. Cold, hard lineup data says that CSKA are an average offensive team with Krstic at center and a proper juggernaut with Hines (or Kaun) at that position, next to a power forward who can shoot (Khryapa, Vorontsevich and even Micov). This is hardly surprising. Even though Hines is undersized, he does not play as a post-modern center. On the contrary, he does most of his damage inside, via putbacks, drives and layups or dunks off the roll.

Simply put, the former Olympiacos center is one of the most versatile threats after he sets a ballscreen. He can connect with the ball handler, clean up the offensive glass (three points per 28 minutes on putbacks last season), or pop out and take bigger opponents off the dribble. What he needs, though, is freedom to get to whichever spot he wants. And nowadays power forwards don’t enjoy that kind of freedom, whether they play inside or outside:

This is Hines in the area of the floor where he is most dangerous. This is also Hines being limited in a specific part of that area. He has to wait and see if the ball handler (Weems in this case) attacks the rim, read the move of the roll man (Krstic) and then do his thing. Perhaps it’s no coincidence that Madrid were able to aggressively trap Weems, forcing a pass to Krstic that was picked up by Sergio Rodriguez.

After the Madrid game Messina remarked that CSKA use a different system than Olympiacos, therefore Hines will have to play a different role. Setting aside lineup data for a minute, those differences are mainly about pace and the lack of a guard with the decision making powers of Spanoulis – Teodosic can’t get to the rim with the same frequency and Pargo is not out of the woods yet. It should also be added that even if Khryapa does get back to doing Khryapa things, Vorontsevich’s defensive inconsistency provides Messina with a pretty good argument for his insistence on Hines as a power forward.

Still, this comes down to a cost-benefit analysis: are CSKA gaining enough from this arrangement to offset the losses from having one of the most dangerous interior players in Europe play out of his range? One of the main benefits from rethinking positions is that each player can maximize its potential by presenting opponents with a set of challenges that they hadn’t been forced to face before. CSKA seem to be reversing this trend, mainly for defensively reasons. But as they heading toward the stretch run of the season, one has to wonder whether they are sacrificing too much flexibility, while also providing their opponents with an obvious help defense point of reference.

George Rowland and sJacas discuss the upcoming Eurocup quarter finals.

Podcast (give it some time – it does load; right-click to download)

(sJacas)

A friend of mine, a childhood Chicago Bulls fan, once told me he refuses to watch replay of the historical Game 6 of the 1998 NBA Finals. He doesn’t want his childhood memories ruined. Having watched said game myself years after it took place, I am certain he is doing the right thing. Subtract the magnitude, the end-of-an-era charm and you’re left with a stagnant, 48-minutes iso-feast, during which Michael Jordan took more than half of his team’s shots. He missed 20.

I always expect to come away disappointed from watching tape of an all-time classic. Most people will tell you the 2002 Final between Kinder Bologna and Panathinaikos was one of the best in modern Euroleague history. It had Bodiroga, Obradović, Ginobili, Rigaudeau, Smodiš, Messina, a large first half lead, a comeback, worthy star performances, a fired-up crowd and tension until the last minute. And yet — guess what — players missed shots. They committed dumb turnovers, left the backdoor open, failed to box out, missed fouls shots, just as they do today. 65 free throws too often brought the game to a standstill. All things considered, it was a great game.

Read the full article here

Podcast

As some of you may have noticed, this blog has been making an effort to decode the meaning of an ancient cliché in basketball lingo: controlling the pace. We’ve discussed it in both a thick-accented podcast and a detailed account of Madrid’s perfect season.

Last week, Ettore Messina (most likely inspired by our work), joined in the conversation, as part of his breakdown of CSKA Moscow’s defense:

First, it’s paramount that we do not allow fastbreak points. Those occur when you take ill-advised shots or turn the ball over. Conversely, taking good shots within the flow of the offense usually gives you a good chance to grab an offensive rebound or at the very least to get back and set up your defense.

Given the high efficiency of transition plays, Messina’s argument provides a great starting point for the definition of this worn out soundbite: teams control the pace when they minimize transition opportunities for their opponents. At the same time, this very efficiency should also encourage teams to try to dictate the tempo by taking advantage of any openings that may lead to quick buckets. This is where a dilemma presents itself: defensive stops can generate valuable fast break opportunities – the average Euroleague team shoots a lot better in possessions that were preceded by a defensive rebound or a steal. And yet, many coaches (including Messina) are hesitant to fully explore these opportunities. Their reasoning is simple: quick possessions increase the risk for turnovers, which in turn increase transition opportunities for opponents.

One of the problems with the low volume of data regarding turnovers is that it’s hard to test this theory – we simply don’t know whether the percentage of transition plays that lead to a turnover is higher compared to half court possessions (at least I don’t; if you happen to be familiar with a relevant study, drop me a line in the comments section). We do know that some of the most brilliant analytical minds in basketball advocate a higher pace. The Houston Rockets under Daryl Morey are the most obvious example, but their underwhelming defensive performance provides some indications that the aforementioned dilemma should not be attributed entirely to a few risk-averse coaches.

This brings us to Messina’s opponent last week. Most Dusko Vujosevic-coached teams have been notorious for playing at an extremely slow pace that favours their big men. This season has been no exception, as the Belgrade club are third from bottom in possessions per game (CSKA are two spots above them). Partizan have the tools to become a productive transition team. Tarence Kinsey and Bogdan Bogdanovic get a lot of steals and can initiate fast breaks on their own (Kinsey is also a great defensive rebounder). Their big men, especially Joffrey Lauvergne and Nikola Milutinov, run the floor pretty well, providing extra options on the open court. Dragan Milosavljevic is fearless in attacking the rim. However, Partizan entered week 3 of the top 16 with the second-worst efficient field goal percentage in shots attempted off steals. Bogdanovic’s limitations as a finisher in the paint and the season-ending injury of the quick-thinking Leo Westermann have a lot to with this number. Still, Partizan should do better.

For Messina, such struggles must have seemed like a particularly promising sign as CSKA visited Belgrade for the second time this season. Then Partizan scored 16 points on 12 transition plays. Those are defined as possessions preceded by a steal or defensive rebound, which lead to a shot within the first eight seconds of the shot clock (I realize that if those variables are modified, the numbers could tell a different story. But this is a small sample, so we’re looking for indications, not definitive answers). Bogdan Bogdanovic’s explosion in the second half dominated the headlines and a few tough makes by Kinsey made it seem like everything was going Partizan’s way, but the home team had a chance in the end thanks toits earlier success in transition.

Vujosevic saw his players score 12 transition points (on 8 possessions) in a first half that was otherwise the offensive slugfest he must have come to expect. That’s more than a third of Partizan’s total production in the first two quarters. For Messina, CSKA’s issues with transition defense must have served as a red flag. Especially when his players got back but could not set up their defense in time:

Even though Partizan got this running opportunity thanks to a steal, CSKA do well at first to stop the ball and take away an easy pass inside to Milutinov. However, this success comes at a cost, as Partizan have a rare opportunity to take advantage of the weak side. Milos Teodosic is forced to front Milutinov with Andrei Vorontsevich covering his back. Nenad Krstic is trailing the play, keeping an eye on Djordje Gagic. This leaves Bogdanovic open on the right wing. Kinsey finds him and Teodosic jumps out to defend him with little success. Bogdanovic blew right past the CSKA guard en route to an easy lay up, as Vorontsevich could not deter him. However the truly problematic part of this sequence for Messina must be Krstic’s reaction. Like most Partizan’s opponents, CSKA’s half court defense in this game relied on packing the paint. Why should things be any different in transition defense? Why did Krstic stay on the perimeter, close to Gagic – hardly a long range threat – as opposed to helping inside?

In other words, getting back on defense is not simply a matter of defenders running the floor. They also need to be aware of team defense principles even when the formation is altered in transition. On the other hand, the more time you have to figure it out, the easier it is to find the right place. This is why shot selection is such a crucial component of transition defense:

This a typically questionable shot selected by Milos Teodosic – a well-contested three with ten seconds on the clock. The fact that he missed is only part of the problem for CSKA. With Sasha Kaun rolling to the basket, Milutinov defending on the perimeter and Kinsey pushing the ball upcourt off his own defensive rebound, Partizan create two favourable matchups on the other end:

First, Kinsey backs down Teodosic, forcing Vorontsevich to help inside, giving up a wide open Bogdanovic three.The shot misses, but Partizan have back up. Milutinov finds himself matched up inside by Vladimir Micov. He seals him off, grabs the offensive board and slams it home. As Messina put it,

taking good shots (…) usually gives you a good chance (…) at the very least to get back and set up your defense’.

Teodosic proved him right on this possession. Then there is the question of effort:

This is another Partizan steal off a Vitaly Fridzon turnover (he is the CSKA player who’s out of bounds in the screenshot). Teodosic is in the left corner. Milenko Tepic is the Partizan player closest to him. Now here’s what happened a few seconds later:

Not only is Tepic wide open and makes a huge baseline jumper with less than a minute remaining in the game, but Fridzon has outrun Teodosic, even though he took off a couple of meters behind him. This is inexcusable and it didn’t happen only once:

A few minutes earlier, Micov thought that airing his grievances about a non-call to a ref nearby was more important than running back. This left Teodosic as the sole defender on the weak side. Kinsey made the extra pass, leading to a wide open corner three for Milosavljevic:

For Vujosevic, the main takeaway from this game should be that Partizan can afford to pick up the pace with little to no risk involved. After all, they have the second-highest turnover rate among Euroleague teams as it is. For Messina…well, he has already written about it:

Perfect preparation doesn’t exist. What you can do though is push your players and demand from them better and better understanding of the game as well as improvement in their ability to react and adjust.

(sJacas)

On the day the Beko-BBL celebrates its fan-voted Allstars in Bonn, here are a bunch of graphs to outline team trends at the halfway mark.

(Raw data from RealGM schedules and team stats; post uses graph code from mbostock)

Bayern lead the league in win percentage (Win%) after 17 games, but Alba Berlin rank first in Pythagorean/Expected Win Percentage (Exp%), which is a win estimate based on offensive and defensive rating (or points for/against, if tempo free stats are unavailable). “Luck” is here merely the margin between expected and actual win percentage.

Three teams — Alba, Ulm and Würzburg — have performed on a level far better than their win/loss record indicates, while another three — Artland, Frankfurt, MBC — are unlikely to maintain their current win/loss record if 2nd half (season) performance is similar to first half performance.

Team Graphs

The team graphs below show offensive and defensive rating adjusted for strength of schedule. If you drop 110 points per 100 possessions on an opponent that conceded 100 points per 100 possession in all remaining games, that means you’re plus 10 in offensive rating for the game. The graphs are not game-by-game, though, but show three games running averages, to not follow every one-game variance (although three games is a fairly short range already). The black line is offensive rating, the invisible line on the other end of the painted area is defensive rating. If the area is red, that means defensive rating has been worse during the three game stretch than offensive rating. Remember: defensive rating is the lower the better. Also consider the scale of the graph, on the Y-axis, which is not consistent.

Playoff Ranks

Bayern München

Akin to their Euroleague performance, Bayern are playing elite-level offense in the BBL, producing extensive stretches of offensive performances 15 to 20 points per 100 possessions above opponents’ defensive season averages. Defense, though ranking third, is closer to league average than it is to the league-leading defense of Alba Berlin.

Early-season dominance has gone missing in recent weeks, with a busy Euroleague schedule possibly taking its toll — even if they are far from alone amongst their BBL rivals in playing lots of games this year.

Brose Baskets

Failure to defend on an even remotely acceptable level — they ranked dead bottom in defensive rating, at 116.6 points per 100 possessions — had been instrumental in Bamberg’s Euroleague exodus, but Bamberg have really been turning it up a gear in the BBL in past weeks, boosted by the arrival of D’Or Fischer.

Offense has dropped likewise, for some reason, and there’s been a visible and measurable change of character with Fischer patrolling the paint and Sanders and Harris disrupting passes with far greater activity than the irregular Markota and the still-rusty Velickovic.

Alba Berlin

Alba Berlin have played a remarkable campaign to date, with even a 13 and 4 record still betraying the quality this team has brought to the floor. Only mean-spirited minds as they undoubtedly exist will hope for an unexpected late-season collapse as it happened last season.

Alba have been the only team that has been defending on an elite level all throughout, holding opponents between five and 15 points per 100 possessions below their season averages through every three-game stretch they’ve had so far. Offense has collapsed occasionally, but super defense remains a fantastic foundation for future success.

EWE Baskets Oldenburg

Oldenburg were second in defensive rating last season and made Bamberg work for their title far harder than a 3-0 finals sweep indicates. They’ve simply not maintained their top-level defense from 2012/13, ranking 4th in defensive rating, but very close to league average.

They escaped an extensive stretch of terrible mid-December performances recently. This is the league’s best team not currently active in Euro competition.

Telekom Baskets Bonn

Bonn were the team of the hour early on. While defense has been dancing around league average, offense has come to a standstill against a fairly easy schedule of opponents. All of this is strongly correlated to topscorer Benas Veikalas’ performance, a player who drops 17.6 points a game on 72.4 percent true shooting on (Eurocup & BBL) opponents when Bonn is winning but regresses to 11.8 points a game on 47.0 percent true shooting in losses.

Artland Dragons

The Artland Dragons are 11 and 6 despite having been outscored. Barring improvement, this win/loss record will be difficult to sustain. The good news is that this is true for a bunch of borderline playoff teams behind them as well.

Ratiopharm Ulm

Ulm have been playing better than their pure win/loss record suggests. Ulm are capable of blowing out opponents and appear to be less of a grind-it-out team.

Offensive performance, ranking a more-than-satisfying second in the league in Year One after John Bryant, has seen some strong fluctuations (consider the scale of the graph) — possibly due to Ulm’s frequent long range shooting.

Fraport Skyliners

Frankfurt, youngest team in the league, are shocking the league with their 9-8 record, but they’re smart not to relax, having recently signed experienced big man Dane Watts.

Their overall performance has been that of a team expected to win two-, rather than three in six.

Non-Playoff Ranks

Partizan Belgrade and Bayern Munich are two very different teams. Partizan play at a slow pace and have the third-worst offense in Euroleague. Bayern play at an above average pace and have the third-best offense in the competition. Partizan have the youngest roster in Euroleague. Bayern’s average player is near his prime years. Bayern have money to spend. Partizan need money to survive.

However, when these teams met at the Audi Dome last week, it became apparent that they share one common trait: they rely on power forwards who can’t spread the floor with their shooting. Joffrey Lauvergne, Djordje Gagic, Deon Thompson and Chevon Troutman practically invite opponents to help off them when they step outside the paint. As it has already been discussed, this deficiency tends to hurt pick and roll execution. However, the power forward is not the only frontline position which can contribute to spacing. Bayern look to John Bryant, their starting center, for help in this area:

The German team scored its first two baskets in this game by going to Thompson on the low block. Bryant was the one feeding him both times, after setting a ball screen and popping out on the perimeter. Nikola Milutinov (number eleven for Partizan) has to honour Bryant’s jumper and can’t help inside on Thompson who battles for position with Lauvergne. The French forward can’t afford to let his man catch the ball deep in the paint, so he tries to front him. The problem is that Milutinov doesn’t have his back. Bryant, an elite passer among Euroleague big men, finds Thompson with a textbook bounce pass. Layup.

Bryant’s passing can also be a valuable asset in transition. No one is going to mistake the American center for the modern day athletic big man who provides his team with an extra option in fast breaks. However, his passing skills serve him well when he trails his running teammates:

Partizan have gotten back in time to prevent a primary transition opportunity, but are forced to give up a mismatch inside, as Lauvergne jumps out to pick up Bryce Taylor at the wing, leaving Bogdan Bogdanovic to deal with Thompson in the paint. Once again, Bryant draws Milutinov away from the basket and makes sure that Thompson capitalizes on his size advantage with another assist.

Finally, Bryant’s perimeter skill set was also useful against Partizan’s 1-3-1 zone:

With three Partizan defenders clogging the middle of the floor, from the top of the key all the way to the baseline, Bayern needed an extra man on the soft spots of the zone, i.e. the wings. Bryant was that man and he found Robin Benzing for an open three at the far left corner. The shot missed, but this play indicates that a center who can pass should not be contained in his traditional role as a post up threat against zone schemes.

Perhaps none of these screenshots says anything new. High-low actions are hardly innovative stuff. The flex offense has required centers to pass the ball from beyond the arc since the 1970s. However, centers acting as playmakers outside the paint raise some interesting question about shot locations and efficiency.

Most of Bryant’s assists come from areas of the floor that are not associated with his position. Most of those assists lead to efficient shots – close-range attempts, three pointers and free throws. The problem is that he also does a lot of bad shooting from these areas – three out of his seven field goal attempts per game are either threes or twos outside the paint. His percentage in both categories is below 30%.However, if Bryant stopped taking those bad shots, a lot of Bayern’s possessions with Thompson on the floor would look like this:

On this Partizan possession Bryant defends the right way, according to advanced stats. He risks an open mid-range jumper by Milutinov and helps take away the interior, high-percentage threat posed by Lauvergne. Milutinov made that shot, but that’s not important. The main takeaway from this screenshot is that if Bryant’s man did not have to worry about his jumper, then the scoring opportunities inside for Thompson would be minimized and the risk of an errant pass in the crowded paint would increase (Bryant turns the ball over at a high rate as it is). At the same time, Thompson would have less room to do what he excels at – going after the offensive rebound:

Again, Lauvergne is forced to front Thompson. Again, no Partizan defender has his back. The high-low pass is not available and Bryant’s jumper misses, as numbers say it would. But Thompson has the opportunity to seal off his man and grab the offensive rebound. Had Milutinov rotated inside after the initial pick and pop action, instead of trying to get back to Bryant and losing his balance, the Bayern forward would have found it harder to attack the glass.

Therefore, Bryant should continue to play in the perimeter when paired with Thompson. Bayern coach Svetislav Pesic will have to take the good (assisted field goals and offensive rebounds inside, along with the occasional made jumper) with the bad (errant passes, missed jumpers). However, Bayern’s opponents should take a page out of Dragan Milosavljevic’s book and try to make the bad happen more often:

Whether he did it instinctively or by design, the Partizan forward defended like a proper stat geek on this play. Once Bryant received the pass on the pick and pop, Milosavljevic rotated halfway toward him, without fully committing to closing out on his jumper. When Bryant looked to pass to Taylor in the corner, Milosavljevic was able to cover the distance. It was enough to throw off the Bayern center and give Milutinov enough time to get back after helping on the ball screen. Eventually Bryant faked a shot and put the ball on the floor since he didn’t have a passing option. Bogdanovic picked up his dribble, leading to a transition opportunity for Partizan.

It’s enough to make you wonder whether Milutinov should not have respected Bryant’s jumper so much on these previous plays. Bayern’s frontline combinations force them to look for points and assists in low percentage areas of the floor. Bayern’s opponents should take advantage by turning Bryant into a volume perimeter shooter – at least until he makes enough of those.

After cruising past Barca in Sunday’s Clasico, Real Madrid are 23 and zero to open the season¹. Average margin of victory? 21.3 points.

Luck, to go along with top-notch quality, is usually a factor in long winning streaks, but Real Madrid’s so-far flawless record is the result of flat-out domination: Dropping offensive ratings of 121.9 (Euroleague) and 117.1² (ACB) points per 100 possessions on opponents while holding them to ratings of 88.9 and 90.5, respectively, on defense, is uncalled for in modern Euroleague/ACB history. Only five games – road wins in Murcia, Gran Canaria, Valencia, Badalona and Milan – finished in single digits.

Easy stops

It is easy to assume Real Madrid’s dominance starts with stops on defense, but there is arguably a hidden context to their rock-solid defensive performance (first in defensive rating in both Euroleague and ACB): Having watched all ten Euroleague matches, five to six ACB encounters and a number of corresponding statements from coaches and players, I would speculate that a bunch of opponents have been sacrificing offensive performance in pursuit of the mysterious “controlling the pace”. I understand the raw theory behind this: slow the game down, take in-control shots when the backcourt is sufficiently covered, keep their shooters out of rhythm. The problem is that offensive output is likely dropping when you are playing out-of-character offense, like Bamberg did in Madrid in week 2. And: Real Madrid are not different from anyone else in that they are playing better offense off stops (steals, defensive rebounds) than dead ball situations. You want to score on them whatever way it is possible – granted, easier said than done – rather than sacrificing quick high-value shots in order to extend possessions.

On defense

The characteristics of defense are rarely as obvious as the offense’s, and Real Madrid are not any different here. There is nothing outrageous about the strategies they apply, but they do have above average athleticism and average player height does not do their length justice. They do have incredibly quick hands; Sergio Rodriguez (3rd), Draper (4th), Rudy (6th), Mirotic (5th) and Slaughter (1st) all feature prominently league-wide in steal percentage on their respective positions. Rudy is probably getting too little credit for his role as on-ball disruptor. Slaughter is very clever stealing post-feeds or poking the ball away from the post-up player. They are 1st in the league, too, in block percentage, with Mirotic and Darden both in the top three on their respective positions.

Slaughter is one of the quickest help-and-recover defenders in the league, and Mejri and even Bourousis are arguably on the mobile end of the spectrum relative to their size.

Potential issues in transition defense have rarely been exposed as opponents, as mentioned appeared intent on running long possessions. Should they ever face a very good transition offense this season – Olympiakos (remember the 2013 Euroleague Final?) and Fenerbahce come to mind – this defense will be truly tested.

On offense

Here on ITG we have been pondering (1, 2, 3) about shot locations, turnovers and all the factors that make a high-quality offense for a while now, and Real Madrid are the closest I’ve witnessed thus far in approaching the ideal offense that produces high-value shots while keeping turnovers to a minimum. They are currently tied for sixth in turnover percentage (ascending) – combined with their league-leading effective field goal percentage (58.9), solid offensive rebounding- and free throw rates, that makes for a good punch.

Among the early trends have been unsuccessful post-ups for Bourousis – the Greek is 1-for-8 on unassisted close range shots (scroll down for his shot chart) – but he’s been adding value by posing an outside stretch five threat. The stretch five is sometimes confusing players and spectators alike to the point where one is left guessing whether opponents are intentionally leaving him open on the pop, or whether they are just overwhelmed by the number of options Real Madrid have.

The threat level reaches scary heights when Real Madrid stop the ball and have Sergio Rodriguez handling the ball on the break. As Serrod is advancing the basketball, Jaycee Carroll is sprinting towards the corner on one wing while Rudy Fernandez is stopping at the extended free throw line on the other. Slaughter, Mejri and Mirotic are always first down the floor in transition. There is a multitude of options for Serrod, who loves to attack early to throw a lob or find shooters on the wing. Real Madrid are 10-for-20 on fastbreak three point shots.

Serrod’s late-clock shot-making

If Nikola Mirotic’s shot making – he’s 18 for 28 from three and 9 for 13 on two point jump shots – is beyond understanding, how about Sergio Rodriguez’s outrageous percentages on difficult shots?

NBA players — there is no league-wide Euroleague data – are shooting 29 percent in average on three point pull-up jump shots. Serrod is shooting 18 for 29. These are shots of high difficulty level.

Collectively grown

The average player peaks at 27 to 28 – 26 to 29³ if you’re looking at an extended period (here and here). Based on Euroleague data, skills such as passing and three point shooting peak later than average (hence, certain types of point guards may peak 30-31 rather than 27-28), while offensive rebounding, shot blocking and drawing shooting fouls peak earlier.

Eight of eleven regular rotation players on Pablo Laso’s roster were born between 1983 and 1987. Only the ultra-talented Nikola Mirotic (1991), late-blooming wing Tremmell Darden (1981) and captain Felipe Reyes (1980) are outside that range. This roster has collectively grown and improved.

Lineup consistency

Laso is the most consistent coach I’ve seen in using five man units, made possible by the roster’s super strong 11-deep rotation and fantastic, stress-free games that rarely demanded hectic substitutions. That’s why the clear patterns in, for example, Jaycee Carroll’s and Dontaye Draper’s minutes.

Last season’s frequent lineup of Llull, Rudy, Suarez, Mirotic and Begic, Laso’s most-used lineup, provided a minus one in 114 minutes, a terrible sign for a top-level Euroleague team. The second unit however, usually featuring Sergio Rodriguez, Jaycee Carroll, Felipe Reyes, Marcus Slaughter and one additional player, regularly ran opponents out of the building. When Laso tore apart his lineups in mid-season – coinciding with the Euroleague Top16 phase – performance dropped.

Suarez and Begic were replaced by Darden and Bourousis during the offseason. In 2013/14, the Real Madrid starting lineup of Llull, Rudy, Darden, Mirotic and Bourousis is plus 38 in 57 minutes. Their second most-used lineup (Draper, Llull, Rudy, Mirotic, Bourousis – the lineup that regularly starts the second half) is plus 39 in 32 minutes. The bench is as productive as ever. You go from occasional second quarter- and regular fourth quarter dominance to regular 40 minutes of dominance. 40 minutes of hell.

More shot charts

¹ That excludes the SuperCopa
² Using the traditional formula with a 0.44 free throw factor; data from RealGM
³ There is a survivor bias, though