Shocking as Spain’s loss against France may have been, it can be explained by a pretty straightforward narrative. The seemingly formidable Spanish front line had one major weakness: they lacked a shooter that would spread the floor and allow his teammates to make the most of the Gasol brothers’ creativity from the low block and the high post. The French defense, anchored by Rudy Gobert, took away scoring opportunities inside and Spain’s struggles from the perimeter made life easier for Vincent Collet. On the other end, Diaw provided everything Spain missed from the power forward position and Thomas Heurtel made his hardcore fans proud.

Personally, I have no problem with this narrative, as long as we are looking for an answer about the end result. To find out the root causes of yesterday’s upset, though, we need to dig deeper. A closer look at the numbers reveals a couple of extra issues for Spain. Their post up offense was quite inefficient (6 points on 11 plays) and it failed to act as the starting point of the beautiful ball movement we have come to expect from Orenga’s team. Again, the lack of perimeter shooting partly explains Spain’s shortcomings, but France did not really flood the strong side with help defenders. In many cases, rushed shots and a lack of counter actions was the real issue:

On this play, Pau Gasol makes a proper read of the French defense and kicks the ball out to Sergio Rodriguez. One of the options for Chacho is a pull up jumper, but Antoine Diot recovers in time after helping down low. Still, Spain have a lot of time on the clock to look for another high percentage look. Only they don’t seem to look hard enough. Once Rodriguez receives the ball, everything freezes – there are no cuts, no attempted  pick and roll play. Eventually, S-Rod tries to get rid of his man off the dribble and once he fails to do so, fires an airball from behind the arc. It was hardly the only time Spain’s possessions featured too much dribbling and not much else.

Even though a pick and roll offense without a stretch four – Serge Ibaka was not the man for the job in this tournament – is a risky endeavor, it can work with a few tweaks. Spain was in desperate need of such adjustments but often went away too early from ideas that worked:

This image offers an interesting solution to spacing problems. Ibaka has been moved to the strong side, making harder for his man to cheat as a help defender inside. Had Florent Pietrus moved closer to the ball, Ibaka would have the opportunity to make a cut directly at the rim, where he can finish with authority. On the other end of the floor, Nic Batum has to stay home on Navarro and Mikael Gelabale lacks the size to stop the roll of Gasol, who draws a shooting foul. Why Spain didn’t run this play more often is a mystery.

The hosts of the tournament also failed to generate and capitalize on transition opportunities. Their defense in this game may look great on paper (France scored 65 points on the same number of possessions) but it didn’t really help their offense. In the first half, Spain got killed by the French movement off the ball, especially back door and baseline cuts. It is worth noting that on the group game between the two teams, France committed 15 turnovers, with Spain getting eleven steals, many of which lead to transition plays. Yesterday France had one more turnover, but Spain recorded seven steals less. Collet had his players ready to move when their opponents played the passing lanes or collapsed on the ball handler. As a result, the Spaniards often got caught looking at the ball.

On this screenshot, Diot looks like he is in trouble. He’s picked up his dribble and Pau has taken away the baseline. On a closer look, though, an opportunity emerges thanks to a lack of communication between Ricky Rubio and Ibaka:

Batum is free to cut along the baseline. Ibaka never sees his as he is concerned about  Gobert rolling to the basket and none of his teammates inform him of what’s going on behind his back. As this video makes clear, such breakdowns occurred often, especially in the first half. Spain’s defense improved in the second half, thanks to greater individual concentration and effort, combined with a more conservative approach which put a premium on rim protection. And there is nothing wrong with that, except Spain failed to force enough live ball turnovers which would rejuvenate their offense. In the end, one of the most fearsome fast break teams of the tournament finished the game with only four transition points.
Transition basketball became even less accessible for Spain due to their rebounding struggles. When the communication isn’t there and rotations are not sharp enough, defenders don’t get the opportunity to box out properly. Simply put, the French offense gave their defense a chance to excel, while the Spanish defense did very little to help their offense. Collet learned his lesson from the group game. Now he needs to do the same against another familiar opponent: Serbia.

We’re talking about controlling the game – defensively and offensively. But in order to control the game, offense is always more important.

This is Dusan Ivkovic’s two cents on the debate about control in basketball. Duda said this in his trademark broken Greek during a press session back in December of 2010, eighteen months before his crowning achievement as a coach. Olympiacos’ triumph at the Istanbul final four was based on a monster defensive performance, but the Serbian legend thinks that control of the game is gained or lost on the other end of the floor. All this may explain his decision to sign Nenad Krstic at Anadolu Efes. Despite indications that he is moving past his prime (last season his per minute scoring and field goal percentage dropped sharply, while his reliance on assisted baskets increased), the former CSKA center remains an elite offensive player. His versatility as a scorer (pick and roll finisher, post up threat, spot up shooter from mid-range) could help ease the growing pains of a team going through a major rebuilding phase. Efes have a lot of things to figure out. Control is not easy to maintain under such circumstances. Krstic’s efficient scoring could help in this area.

Then again, Ivkovic did not pick Krstic simply for philosophical reasons. Trust is obviously a factor. The two men have worked together with considerable success in the Serbian national team. Krstic carried Serbia’s offense at the 2013 Eurobasket, Duda’s last tournament as the coach of the national team, en route to an unexpected World Cup berth (by the way, can we please stop calling it the World Cup? Football fans are laughing at us). Ivkovic knows how to maximize Krstic’s talents in a plethora of pick and roll and post up actions. But what about defense?

At this point Krstic is a very limited defender. In their latest Euroleague campaign, CSKA conceded 103 points per a hundred possessions with him on the floor. It was an above average performance, but this number does not tell the whole story. Not only did the Russian powerhouse transformed into an elite defensive team when Krstic sat on the bench (their 97.7 defensive rating during those stretches would top the Euroleague over a full season), but their offensive productive often took a hit as Ettore Messina tried to cover his center’s back by deploying a few unconventional lineups. Kyle Hines, arguably a top-3 center in 2012-2013, played 363 of his 549 Euroleague minutes at power forward (injuries to Viktor Khryapa also played a part in Messina’s planning). This arrangement not only led CSKA to underperform on offense, where spacing was an issue, but also prevented them from maximizing their potential on defense: both Hines and Sasha Kaun, the other option at center, were clearly more effective defenders at the five position. Simply put, Krstic was the odd man of the CSKA frontline.

Of course this doesn’t necessarily mean that he will be a bad fit at Efes. Reliable big men don’t grow on trees, as evidenced by the hefty buy out sums paid in previous offseasons for the likes of Stanko Barac and Luka Zoric (yes, Zoric did more to justify his deal). Still, Ivkovic must know that Krstic’s defense raises some valid concerns – at least that’s what the table below says:

Table: Nenad Krstic: Pick and Roll Defense at Eurobasket 2013

*play: a possession involving a pick and roll set defended by Krstic and ending with a shot, a turnover, a shooting foul, or a putback attempt.

My loyal readers (all three of them) will probably remember that measuring pick and roll defense is a tricky notion – the two man game is defended by at least two players. Therefore, blaming Krstic for all the baskets Serbia allowed on the plays recorded on this table would not be terribly accurate. However, these numbers demonstrate two significant challenges for Efes:

1. Serbia had the fourth-worst defensive rating at the 2013 Eurobasket and some of their worst performances on that end of the floor (against Spain, Italy and Ukraine), coincided with their opponents attacking Krstic on the pick and roll.
2. Krstic would find himself at the epicenter of such actions fifteen times per game. Hiding your center’s defensive deficiencies in the pick and roll era is extremely hard.

With that in mind, let’s see how Duda used the newest Efes center on pick and roll defense:

Flat defense

This was Serbia’s go to strategy with Krstic on the floor:

The Serbian center would drop back to the free throw line, with his teammate going over the screen. In theory, this is the best way to prevent opponents from exploiting Krstic’s limited mobility. In these situations big men are required to slow down the ball handler and get back to the roll man without having to cover a great distance. Ivkovic also likes this set up because it allows his team to keep defensive rotations at a minimum. And that’s a good thing according to the Efes coach, whose defensive philosophy can be explained by his criticism of pick and roll-heavy offensive playbooks:

Now we all play pick and rolls, usually as a two-man game. I’m afraid this strategy is ruining basketball. In pick and rolls there’s only one player passing. The other four are watching.

Notice how Duda says ‘we’. No coach can afford to ignore the advantages created by the pick and roll (bigs stepping out at the expense of rim protection, perimeter guys rotating at the expense of defensive balance). However, Ivkovic’s concern about the impact of such actions on ball movement also inform his defensive approach. His main goal is to isolate the ball handler from his teammates by taking away passing lanes toward the roll man and having the other three defenders stay home on shooters and cutters.

At 2013 Eurobasket Krstic often struggled to hold his end of the deal. In the picture above his angle is not ideal, as he doesn’t take away the driving lane to the left of the ball handler. His footwork does not allow him to make up for his poor initial positioning and Serbia concedes a close range attempt:

Of course not all is lost at this point. Krstic’s teammates have managed to take away all other options, which means that the Serbian center can focus on a traditional big man task: challenging a shot at the rim. Unfortunately, he is not very good at it either, even at games where Serbia’s defense was at its best. The table above indicates that Kristic’s defensive performance against Lithuania was one of his best at the tournament. However, Mantas Kalnietis was able to attack him in pick and roll actions during the fourth quarter. Krstic could not stop the Lithuanian guard outside the paint, nor significantly alter his shots at the rim. This sequence against Ukraine tells the same story: the high percentage shot missed, but it was the shot Serbia’s opponents wanted. This is why the play resulted in an offensive rebound and a putback, with Krstic out of the picture:

To sum up: Krstic doesn’t really stop the ball away from the basket and is not much of an intimidator inside. Therefore, a flat coverage can only work if the Efes guard defending the ball handler can go around a screen quick enough and/or if opponents are baited into taking low percentage mid-range jumpers off the dribble (hey, it could work against Keith Langford). But what happens if the ball handler is a dangerous shooter from beyond the arc?

Hedge out

It has already been mentioned how Ivkovic is not comfortable with extensive defensive rotations. But when the ball handler has no qualms about pulling up coming off the ball screen and is not explosive enough to make defenses pay for crowding him, it is worth deploying a more aggressive strategy: having your big man meet him at the three point line, with help defenders covering his back and the guard going over the screen:

Again, Krstic displays poor positioning and anticipation, as he doesn’t push the ball handler away from the basket. His limited athleticism obviously plays a part, but doesn’t explain everything. Darjus Lavrinovic – not exactly the archetype of an athletic big man – demonstrates what Krstic does wrong:

Unlike Lavrinovic, Krstic allows ball handlers to turn the corner coming off the ballscreen. This leaves him vulnerable to pocket passes toward the roll man and gives the opposing guard to split any double teams the defense might try. In other words, help defenders have to take on more responsibilities and act faster, as defense on the ball hardly slows down the offensive execution.

Switch

We don’t need a screenshot for this one: the big man steps out to play the ball handler one on one, while the defending guards fronts the roll man, denying an entry pass in the paint. Pretty straightforward stuff. Even though this strategy is usually reserved for more mobile centers, Duda had Krstic switch in late clock situations or when opponents run 4/5 pick and rolls, with the likes of Linas Kleiza and Luigi Datome handling the ball. This approach might throw opponents off and cause guards to overdribble – remember how Madrid struggled to make the correct reads against the switching Olympiacos defense? But it could also present an extra challenge for Efes as Kristic tends to lose guards once they pass the ball. Take this play, against Bo McCalebb:

While you would probably expect Bo to blow right past Krstic on the switch, the Serbian center actually does a pretty good job of leading him toward the help. Once McCalebb gives up the ball however, Krstic gets lost in defensive no man’s land:

Bo makes it to the left corner, with Krstic drifting behind Vladimir Stimac on the low post. The open three dropped, as no Serbia player closes out on the shooter.

Changing the discussion

With Nemanja Bjelica the only conventional power forward in Serbia’s roster last summer, Ivkovic often deployed twin tower lineups: Krstic would share the frontcourt with fellow centers Djordje Gagic or Stimac. This would allow Duda to hide him as a help defender against pick and rolls. Could a similar strategy work at Efes?

Pairing Krstic with Stephane Lasme sounds promising. Both are productive as mid-range shooters, a skill which could help Efes deal with spacing issues of lineups that do not feature a stretch four. On the other end of the floor, Lasme is a trustworth pick and roll defender. However, the answer in not so simple. First of all Lasme is also moving past his prime and was extremely foul prone last season. Will Efes have enough depth to get away with playing their two main centers at the same time? Also, Krstic as a help defender is not exactly a safe bet:

This is Krstic as power forward. His job on this play is to rotate toward the roll man if the ball handler finds him. Given the short distance it shouldn’t be a problem, right? All Krstic has to do is take a couple of steps to the left and raise his hands. Well, see for yourself:

There is no type of pick and roll defense that allows a team to completely avoid rotations. Duda’s schemes are designed to have such rotations take place on his own terms – late on the shot clock and after his players have taken away most passing options. Still, rotations need to be executed properly. More often than not Krstic does not deliver.

Of course the Serbian center will have considerable help at Efes. Dontaye Draper and Dogus Balbay are excellent defenders on the ball, who could drastically reduce his own work load by recovering quickly after the screen has been set. Lasme is very useful as insurance policy. And help defenders can always make a difference. However, Duda has his work cut out for him. Efes spent a significant amount on a player who seems to be productive only on one side of the floor. And even though the Turkish club has money to spend, its resources are not limitless. One has to wonder whether the could get better value for the money. But right now that’s a rhetorical question. What matters more is how Ivkovic is going to find a way around all those defensive issues.

Pablo Laso and Xavi Pascual may come across as polar opposites when it comes to coaching philosophies, but it could be argued that the styles of Ettore Messina and David Blatt are just as different. The Italian favourite and the American underdog seem to hold contrasting views in most aspects of the game – size, pace, offensive principles, defensive flexibility and so on. This is why the less hyped of the two semifinals in Mian, between CSKA Moscow and Maccabi Tel Aviv, could be just as intriguing as the clásico that everyone has been waiting for.

Then again you wouldn’t know that judging from the two top – 16 game between the two powerhouses. CSKA destroyed Maccabi in Moscow and pulled off a gutsy win at Tel Aviv despite  - or thanks to, if you are one of those people – the absence of Milos Teodosic (Maccabi were also without a key player in Devin Smith). This why the Russians should be treated as the favorites, even after two embarrassing homes losses on the eve of the final four against Lokomotiv Kuban, which had Messina exploring the depths of human nature. However, CSKA’s VTB League struggles have served as reminders about certain holes which can be exploited by Maccabi.

For a Messina-coached team, CSKA have occasionally appeared shockingly incompetent in transition defense, a deficiency which could play right into Maccabi’s free flowing offensive tendencies. At the same time, they have also looked vulnerable in the perimeter. Not only have they allowed Loko to make 15 of 32 three pointers in the first two games of their playoffs series, but CSKA have also gotten away with giving up a bunch of open looks from beyond the arc to other opponents (the quarterfinals against Panathinaikos offer many good examples of this issue). Simply put, they might not be as lucky against an opponent that ranks third in three-point percentage.

On the other hand, Maccabi have even more problems to work out regarding their own defense. CSKA scored at will in both games, as their ball movement, size and, somewhat unexpectedly, speed seemed to overwhelm the Israeli champs. At Tel Aviv Aaron Jackson, Sonny Weems and Kyle Hines had a field day on the open court, as CSKA scored 15 transition points (after a Maccabi miss or turnover, within the first 8 seconds of the shot clock) in the first half. With Maccabi turning the ball over at nearly a quarter of their possessions this sort of effectiveness is pretty reasonable. Therefore, Blatt will need better decision making from his ball handlers. Joe Ingles is one of them:

One of the foundations of CSKA’s defense is leading slashers into the interior help without giving up passing lanes. In other words, shot creators need to be patient to figure out what this defense is giving them. This is where Ingles gets it wrong on this play.  He picks up his dribble too early, doesn’t recognize Fridzon helping from the strong side and drives straight into Sasha Kaun, eventually trying to force a pass to Alex Tyus, which is picked up by Hines and leads to a jump ball. The Australian should watch some tape of Tyrece Rice from the same game:

With Kaun dropping back on the pick and roll, Rice can afford to keep his dribble alive and get in the paint. Meanwhile Tyus has gotten underneath the rim, preventing the CSKA center from  fully committing on the ball. This more patient approach offers two advantages. First, Rice gets a good look at one of his patented floaters (which he made on this play). Second, the CSKA defense is forced to move – notice how Victor Khryapa slides toward the paint to help the helping Kaun, freeing up Guy Pnini on the left wing. Maccabi like to keep opponents on their toes and taking advantage of every opening, regardless of how many seconds are left on the shot clock. Against CSKA’s length, however, Blatt should prepare his players to let the defense come to them.

In a half court setting, Maccabi’s defense was dominated inside and out. CSKA could pass over the defense and rotations left a lot to be desired. Looking ahead to Friday, Blatt needs to do a better job of exposing the spacing issues which arise when Kyle Hines plays power forward.

In plays like this one, David Blu simply needs to leave Hines all alone behind the three point line and help the undersize Tyus take away the passing lane toward Kaun (who scored on this possession). Maccabi should be better prepared to defend in such situations, which include double teams when CSKA’s big perimeter players are posting up:

Here Blu and Ricky Hickman have just trapped Sonny Weems on the low block. The ball is kicked out to Hines and Pnini performs a typical rotation toward the ball, leaving Yogev Ohayon in charge of two shooters in the weak side. Hines swings the ball to Khryapa, extra pass to Jackson, open corner three made. On Friday, Pnini should probably stay closer to Khryapa, leaving Hickman and Blu to deal with the only threat posed by Hines on this area of the floor – a drive toward the basket. Maccabi could also adopt a more practical approach when they have to deal with Hines as a screener:

It would be surprising if Maccabi defended so aggressively against the pick and roll, even when the ball is in the hands of more aggressive slasher than Vitaly Fridzon. Joe Ingles in particular should be quite effective as a switch defender when Hines rolls to the basket. On this play the trap backfires once again, as Hines receives the pass from Fridzon and proceeds to immediately find Kaun inside. Speaking of CSKA’s pick and roll, the limitations of Maccabi’s centers could be a deciding point of the semifinal:

Sofoklis Schortsanitis hedges out against Weems, freeing up Nenad Krstic for one of his patented mid-range jumpers. Once again the dominoes in Maccabi fall: Ohauyon covers the Serbian center, who finds Jackson on the corner for another made three. It looks like a safer bet would be to force CSKA’s ball handlers – especially Jackson and Teodosic who should be less than fully fit on Friday – to look for their own shot off the dribble, an option that Messina doesn’t really aprove.  Another option for Blatt is his trademark matchup zone, which did not make a difference in the previous two games. CSKA’s size had a lot to with it:

The passing angle on this Weems/Kaun pick and roll is not ideal, but the ball still gets to the Serbian center, as Tyus’ positioning does not allow him to make up for his size disadvantage. Again, though, Hines’ man (Ingles on this play) should have rotated deeper into the paint. On another play, Hines was the one creating the mismatch, as he found Hickman in front of him at the top of the key, as part of Maccabi’s zone formation. Hines cut toward the rim, forcing the American guard to follow him inside (and foul him). Had Blu picked up Hines, Ohayon would once again find himself between two shooters on the weak side:

It is pretty clear then that CSKA can create more problems inside and out. This is why they are the favorites. At the same time, Blatt can afford to take some risks that could  change the discussion: Maccabi will probably allow some CSKA shots that could reduce the significance of X’s and O’s and test the Russian team’s character and confidence. Needless to say, all champions need to answer this call at some point.

May 16th will mark the fourth time this season that Real Madrid face Barcelona. The stakes will be higher, the game will take place outside of Spain and a couple of injuries could alter the rotations of both teams. However, the first three versions of this season’s clásico offer plenty of material for a Euroleague semifinal preview.

Numbers indicate that the two Spanish giants find it difficult to stop each other from scoring.  Madrid’s triumph against the blaugrana at the London final four was based on an inspired defensive performance in the closing minutes of the game, but the Spanish champs have not been able  to reproduce it this season. Barcelona scored a little over 106 points per a hundred possessions in their three meetings with the second-best defense in Euroleague. This number could have easily been a lot more impressive had they not missed 12 free throws – not to mention a few great looks from behind the arc – at the Copa Del Rey final. The main reason for Barcelona’s success on the offensive end is their pick and roll execution:

Marcelinho Huertas in particular has been a force in the middle of floor, making shots and dishing out assists in the area which extends from the three-point line to the free throw line. Madrid’s defense enables him to get to his spots, as their big men are limited to a “show and get back” defense which hardly stops the ball and fails to close the passing lane toward the roll man. And when the weak side defender rotates deep to help the helping center, Barcelona have been able to generate more than a few open looks from the corner and the wing. Madrid have tried to counter with a more aggressive approach, designed to prevent Huertas and the other Barcelona ball handlers from turning the corner and getting to the middle of the floor. This strategy opens up a driving lane on the opposite side of the ball screen, but it provides help defenders with more time in order to complete their rotations. However, stopping the ball is still a challenge for Pablo Laso:

The possible absence of Dontaye Draper (who fractured his arm in game 1 of the playoffs) will certainly impact Madrid’s defense on the ball. In any case however, it is evident that the merengues rotate more than they would like to. Ante Tomic is very dangerous on the short roll, both as a passer and a finisher a few feet away from the hoop. This means that Madrid center need to be very quick on the feet. Sounds like a job for Marcus Slaughter, who has had an uneven Euroleague campaign but remain the best pick and roll defender of his team.

Then again, Madrid could win this game by simply outscoring Barcelona. Xavi Pascual has not managed to build the defensive wall of previous season, but his team still gets more stops than most. This has not been the case against Madrid, who continue to capitalize on a series of mismatches, making the blaugrana defense look average at best. The most talked about example of this trend is the way Laso attacks Juan Carlo Navarro, who could be in for a long night given his questionable fitness after the leg injury he picked up against Galatasaray. But the power forward position has proved an even more noticeable chink in Barcelona’s armor:

No matter who plays the four for the blaugrana, and no matter what Madrid run on their offense, Nikola Mirotic and Felipe Reyes have been devastating. Erazem Lorbek, Bostjan Nachbar and Macej Lampe have looked clueless for the most part: they can’t defend the pick and roll, are not serviceable as help defenders, do not box out effectively, need all the help they can get in post up actions and cannot keep up when their opponents attack off the dribble. They are only so many schemes that Pascual can draw up in order to cover for those deficiencies. Given the familiarity between the two teams, there is very little room for tactical surprises. Both coaches have implemented at times their favourite variations of zone defense – Laso going with a zone press led by Slaughter’s defense on the ball and Pascual bring out his trusted 2-3 formation:

In these situations, Barcelona run the risk of being spread thin on the perimeter. All it takes is a quick entry pass, and suddenly the zone has a weakside problem:

On this play, Slaughter found Mirotic on the far corner for an open three. It is clear that Huertas should have rotated toward Carroll on the right wing. But if one looks at the big picture, Pascual’s zone has the same objective as the Olympiacos switch defense which slowed down Madrid for two games and a half: always have a defender in front of Madrid’s perimeter shot creators and force the big men to make more decisions than usual. Even when Barcelona were defending man to man, Pascual often tried to crowd the ball handler:

Again, this approach is not without risks, given Madrid’s efficiency from three-point range. And Barcelona’s big men are not mobile enough to chase the likes of Sergio Rodriguez in the perimeter for extended stretches. But those blitz tactics could pay dividends in key moments of a knockout game. Madrid, on the other hand can probably take more risks with Barcelona’s perimeter shooting, given the inconsistency of the blaugrana in this area. But they still need to improve their pick and roll defense.

The fact that there are no secrets between those two teams could actually make this semifinal even more exciting: if a tactical adjustment by either coach makes a noticeable difference, then it will have to be something really special. The individual effort which will be required by the players of both teams in order to overcome such a well-prepared opponent should also be remarkable. And overall, this promises to be a balanced game. Madrid have been the best team in Europe all season, but Barcelona  lost the most important duel so far ( that would be the Copa Del Rey final) due to their own shortcomings, not because they were outplayed. And while it is understandable that watching the same group of teams compete for the Euroleague title year after year can take away some of the excitement, this game should be special.

Madrid had done their homework

Coming into the playoffs, Olympiacos lineups featuring Bryant Dunston at power forward were particularly prolific on offense, to the tune of more than 120 points per a hundred possessions. It’s safe to say that this number dropped somewhat after a disastrous start to the game for the champs, who were -12 with that old school formation on the floor. The American center moved to the four during the top 16, as a replacement to the injured Giorgos Printezis. Opponents were often caught off guard, allowing Dunston to dive toward the hoop from the weakside, finishing strong at the rim and pick up a few transition-initiating steals at the perimeter. Pablo Laso had apparently watched enough tape to not fall for this trick.

Vassilis Spanoulis scored zero points and had zero assists at the painted area in the first half. Even though he was perceived (by some unreliable analysts, at least) to have an advantage over Giannis Bouroussis, Olympiacos scored just six points in seven pick and roll plays that had the Reds captain going up against the Greek center. The pictures below explain this number: With Brent Petway picking up two early fouls, spreading the floor  was an impossible task. This was especially true when Dunston was the second big man, as Nicola Mirotic was free to roam toward Spanoulis:

Even though there was no room inside, with the aggressive Madrid defense on the ball creating havoc, Bartzokas should not completely ditch this lineup. After all Printezis is coming off a very serious injury and his conditioning is a mystery. Petway is foul prone. However, Dunston seems to match up better against Reyes, whether he is banging for position inside or taking advantage of the Spaniard’s limited mobility at defense (at least compared to the seemingly omnispresent Mirotic). Reyes got in Petway’s head, who seemed overmatched at the post, but can keep up with Mirotic outside, while also keeping weakside defenders honest.

Olympiacos picked more than one poison

Madrid on the other hand, had no spacing issues. They hit their threes and despite an off night by Sergio Rodriguez scored enough points inside off the pick and roll. With Olympiacos turning the ball over at an alarming rate, a popular talking point has been pace and how Madrid controlled it. This was true in the first quarter, when the merengues scored six points on four transition plays. However, they were as effective in a half court setting  as the 67-possession pace required them to be. The Reds tried to deal with Madrid pick and rolls by having their big men hedge out. The good news was that S-Rod turned it over twice in the second quarter when faced with this strategy. The bad news was that soft spots kept popping up, inside and out. The best offense in Europe had no problem taking advantage:

With Shermadini stepping outside and Bouroussis rolling to the basket, the Olympiacos power forward has to rotate inside. Mirotic is wide open and proceeds to showcase the full repertoire – pump fake and cross-court hockey assist to Llull who swings it to Rudy. Open three. Madrid also capitalized on the 1-4 pick and roll, as Mirotic and Reyes combined for six points on four plays. In one of those plays, Rudy’s underrated passing ability (underrated even by Rudy himself sometimes) was on display:

Very few point guards in Europe could connect with the roll man from that angle. However, this picture also capture a hole in Olympiacos’ hedge out defense: Dunston often allows the ball handler to turn the corner. One counter would be a deeper rotation by Shermadini, risking a three by Bouroussis or Mejri. But even that option is not available when the ball handler splits the hedge out:

Dunston has been a dominant shot blocker, but his footwork is often questionable. Therefore he often relies on the work done by perimeter defenders on the ground in order to make the most of his ability above the rim. Against Madrid’s explosiveness, he simply has to do more, or risk giving up more three point plays like this one, materialized by Rodriguez at the rim. The same goes for all Olympiacos centers, even when Madrid deploy their non-stretch four lineups:

In theory, Reyes’ limited shooting range would allow a more aggressive approach, as help defenders would have to cover less ground. This is why Printezis is stationed under the basket. However, the hedging defender has to force the ball handler away from the hoop, otherwise Olympiacos guards will not have enough time to recover. This is exactly what happens here, as Rodriguez turns the corner, putting Printezis in an one-against-two situation, which ends up in a Reyes layup.

A couple of potential openings

Simply put, Madrid’s run in the first half was based on a diverse offensive portfolio and a keen awareness of Olympiacos’ spacing issues. The Reds countered with a stretch of hot shooting. Looking ahead to Game 2, Madrid’s success seems more sustainable. However, Olympiacos could resort to certain actions that caused their opponents’ aggressiveness on the ball or against Spanoulis to backfire:

It’s a safe bet that Laso will try to help Spanoulis’ man as much as possible when he’s fighting through picks off the ball. That’s what Rudy does here, opening up a driving lane which results in a Papapetrou layup. Matt Lojeski should also look for such openings, as Olympiacos needs more points from him. There are also some opportunities created by Madrid’s pick and roll defense:

No matter how crowded the paint gets, Olympiacos power forwards should find plenty of room beyond the arc. This is the case with Printezis on this play. There are two ways to take advantage of this space. If the defenders stay inside, Printezis – and Petway – have to shoot. If their man closes out on them, then they have to look for the roll man. Both Bouroussis and Mejri should have some trouble recovering in time. If the ball handler makes a quick pass to the strong side, then there is a possibility for more possessions like this, which concluded with a Printezis-Simmons alley oop.

A major question is whether Olympiacos are actually fit enough to take advantage of the few opportunities created by Madrid’s defense. Spanoulis got to the rim on a couple of plays, but couldn’t finish like he usually does. Has he made a full recovery from his recent knee injury? Printezis performed like the prolific scorer that he is, but he ran out of breath rather quickly, in his first game back from a rib/lower back/Olympiacos-medical-staff-can’t-really-say injury. Perperoglou is sick and likely to sit out game two. Madrid would be a handful even if the champs were in top form. Setting aside Xs and Os then, the question is how deep they can dig to make this series competitive.

Here’s the problem with paradigm shifts: they are often associated with too many gray areas to neatly fit an analytical model. Take Euroleague centers. It could be argued that the omnipresence of pick and roll sets in a modern European offense has changed the way the position is played- size is less important than explosiveness and agility, footwork in the post has taken a backseat to defensive footwork. This is why undersized Olympiacos dominated inside against CSKA Moscow in last season’s final four. This is why Stephane Lasme won the Defensive Player of the Year award. This is why every Real Madrid opponent this season secretly hopes that Pablo Laso will keep playing Giannis Bouroussis over Marcus Slaughter (or maybe I’m just prejudiced against Bouroussis).

However, the narrative is not linear. Injuries, chemistry issues and a few good seven – footers have kept the frontcourt traditions alive. This season, CSKA find themselves in one of those gray areas: Nenad Krstic is mostly old-school: he can score with his back to the basket, but lacks the footspeed to properly defend pick and rolls. The only ‘modern’ aspect of his game is his shooting range, which extends to the long two pointer area. Kyle Hines is on the other end of the spectrum. Sasha Kaun is somewhere in between – not as polished on the low post as Krstic, but a much more effective pick and roll defender and a more explosive finisher. When Hines signed with CSKA last summer, there were a few questions about whether Ettore Messina could find enough minutes for all three. The answer was simple: with Viktor Khryapa struggling and Andrei Vorontsevich in and out of the doghouse, Hines, an emblematic figure in Euroleague’s positional revolution, has seen most of his minutes at power forward.The following screencap from their recent game at Madrid suggests that this is not a particularly good idea for CSKA’s offense:

This is a typical issue for any pick and roll offense without a stretch four (or lack of shooting in one of the three perimeter positions): at least one help defender – Mirotic in the instance – can cheat off his man and help inside (also notice Rudy’s aggressive and somewhat risky rotation toward Pargo from the strong side). CSKA have been deploying two-center lineups since last season, so they can run some pretty effective counters, taking advantage of Krstic’s mid-range productivity.

This side pick and roll starts with the Serbian center in the paint. Once Hines rolls to the basket Krstic moves at the free throw line. Reyes stays with him, as he has to honour his jumper. This leaves the two defenders guarding the pick and roll, Rudy and Mirotic in a tough place. If Mirotic hedges out, Hines has a free path to the basket; if Rudy goes under the screen he risks an open three by Vladimir Micov; and if Mirotic stays flat, with Rudy going over the screen, the former could find himself in the middle of a Hines-Micov two-man game. This why Madrid resorts to a switch, with Rudy overplaying Hines:

The only problem is that none of his teammates has his back (perhaps Llull should have rotated deeper, given the distance a potential pass to Fridzon would have to cover). Hines receives the lob pass, is fouled and goes to the free throw line. Another way for CSKA around spacing issues has been mixing pick and rolls with certain principles of the flex offense:

Weems has the ball on the top of the key. Hines is an option as a screen setter, which means that Mirotic can’t roam around. In other words, CSKA are trying a different approach to spreading the floor through their power forward. Fridzon is the one taking advantage of that space, by coming off a Krstic baseline pick and hitting the layup. This sort of offensive diversity is aesthetically pleasing as an alternative to a steady diet of pick and rolls. But it is not particularly efficient. Compared to their season average, CSKA’s production drops by nearly five points per a hundred possessions when Hines plays the four. On the other hand, with the American at center, their offense improves by nearly three points per a a hundred possessions.

Such discrepancies can be attributed to multiple factors: lack of shooting from the power forward position, an overreliance on 1-4 pick and rolls which allow opponents to keep their slow footed centers out of harm’s way and an emphasis on post up actions for Krstic or Kaun, which are unlikely to be the most efficient option in Messina’s playbook – or most playbooks for that matter. But a bigger problem is how underused Hines has been this season. Cold, hard lineup data says that CSKA are an average offensive team with Krstic at center and a proper juggernaut with Hines (or Kaun) at that position, next to a power forward who can shoot (Khryapa, Vorontsevich and even Micov). This is hardly surprising. Even though Hines is undersized, he does not play as a post-modern center. On the contrary, he does most of his damage inside, via putbacks, drives and layups or dunks off the roll.

Simply put, the former Olympiacos center is one of the most versatile threats after he sets a ballscreen. He can connect with the ball handler, clean up the offensive glass (three points per 28 minutes on putbacks last season), or pop out and take bigger opponents off the dribble. What he needs, though, is freedom to get to whichever spot he wants. And nowadays power forwards don’t enjoy that kind of freedom, whether they play inside or outside:

This is Hines in the area of the floor where he is most dangerous. This is also Hines being limited in a specific part of that area. He has to wait and see if the ball handler (Weems in this case) attacks the rim, read the move of the roll man (Krstic) and then do his thing. Perhaps it’s no coincidence that Madrid were able to aggressively trap Weems, forcing a pass to Krstic that was picked up by Sergio Rodriguez.

After the Madrid game Messina remarked that CSKA use a different system than Olympiacos, therefore Hines will have to play a different role. Setting aside lineup data for a minute, those differences are mainly about pace and the lack of a guard with the decision making powers of Spanoulis – Teodosic can’t get to the rim with the same frequency and Pargo is not out of the woods yet. It should also be added that even if Khryapa does get back to doing Khryapa things, Vorontsevich’s defensive inconsistency provides Messina with a pretty good argument for his insistence on Hines as a power forward.

Still, this comes down to a cost-benefit analysis: are CSKA gaining enough from this arrangement to offset the losses from having one of the most dangerous interior players in Europe play out of his range? One of the main benefits from rethinking positions is that each player can maximize its potential by presenting opponents with a set of challenges that they hadn’t been forced to face before. CSKA seem to be reversing this trend, mainly for defensively reasons. But as they heading toward the stretch run of the season, one has to wonder whether they are sacrificing too much flexibility, while also providing their opponents with an obvious help defense point of reference.

As some of you may have noticed, this blog has been making an effort to decode the meaning of an ancient cliché in basketball lingo: controlling the pace. We’ve discussed it in both a thick-accented podcast and a detailed account of Madrid’s perfect season.

Last week, Ettore Messina (most likely inspired by our work), joined in the conversation, as part of his breakdown of CSKA Moscow’s defense:

First, it’s paramount that we do not allow fastbreak points. Those occur when you take ill-advised shots or turn the ball over. Conversely, taking good shots within the flow of the offense usually gives you a good chance to grab an offensive rebound or at the very least to get back and set up your defense.

Given the high efficiency of transition plays, Messina’s argument provides a great starting point for the definition of this worn out soundbite: teams control the pace when they minimize transition opportunities for their opponents. At the same time, this very efficiency should also encourage teams to try to dictate the tempo by taking advantage of any openings that may lead to quick buckets. This is where a dilemma presents itself: defensive stops can generate valuable fast break opportunities – the average Euroleague team shoots a lot better in possessions that were preceded by a defensive rebound or a steal. And yet, many coaches (including Messina) are hesitant to fully explore these opportunities. Their reasoning is simple: quick possessions increase the risk for turnovers, which in turn increase transition opportunities for opponents.

One of the problems with the low volume of data regarding turnovers is that it’s hard to test this theory – we simply don’t know whether the percentage of transition plays that lead to a turnover is higher compared to half court possessions (at least I don’t; if you happen to be familiar with a relevant study, drop me a line in the comments section). We do know that some of the most brilliant analytical minds in basketball advocate a higher pace. The Houston Rockets under Daryl Morey are the most obvious example, but their underwhelming defensive performance provides some indications that the aforementioned dilemma should not be attributed entirely to a few risk-averse coaches.

This brings us to Messina’s opponent last week. Most Dusko Vujosevic-coached teams have been notorious for playing at an extremely slow pace that favours their big men. This season has been no exception, as the Belgrade club are third from bottom in possessions per game (CSKA are two spots above them). Partizan have the tools to become a productive transition team. Tarence Kinsey and Bogdan Bogdanovic get a lot of steals and can initiate fast breaks on their own (Kinsey is also a great defensive rebounder). Their big men, especially Joffrey Lauvergne and Nikola Milutinov, run the floor pretty well, providing extra options on the open court. Dragan Milosavljevic is fearless in attacking the rim. However, Partizan entered week 3 of the top 16 with the second-worst efficient field goal percentage in shots attempted off steals. Bogdanovic’s limitations as a finisher in the paint and the season-ending injury of the quick-thinking Leo Westermann have a lot to with this number. Still, Partizan should do better.

For Messina, such struggles must have seemed like a particularly promising sign as CSKA visited Belgrade for the second time this season. Then Partizan scored 16 points on 12 transition plays. Those are defined as possessions preceded by a steal or defensive rebound, which lead to a shot within the first eight seconds of the shot clock (I realize that if those variables are modified, the numbers could tell a different story. But this is a small sample, so we’re looking for indications, not definitive answers). Bogdan Bogdanovic’s explosion in the second half dominated the headlines and a few tough makes by Kinsey made it seem like everything was going Partizan’s way, but the home team had a chance in the end thanks toits earlier success in transition.

Vujosevic saw his players score 12 transition points (on 8 possessions) in a first half that was otherwise the offensive slugfest he must have come to expect. That’s more than a third of Partizan’s total production in the first two quarters. For Messina, CSKA’s issues with transition defense must have served as a red flag. Especially when his players got back but could not set up their defense in time:

Even though Partizan got this running opportunity thanks to a steal, CSKA do well at first to stop the ball and take away an easy pass inside to Milutinov. However, this success comes at a cost, as Partizan have a rare opportunity to take advantage of the weak side. Milos Teodosic is forced to front Milutinov with Andrei Vorontsevich covering his back. Nenad Krstic is trailing the play, keeping an eye on Djordje Gagic. This leaves Bogdanovic open on the right wing. Kinsey finds him and Teodosic jumps out to defend him with little success. Bogdanovic blew right past the CSKA guard en route to an easy lay up, as Vorontsevich could not deter him. However the truly problematic part of this sequence for Messina must be Krstic’s reaction. Like most Partizan’s opponents, CSKA’s half court defense in this game relied on packing the paint. Why should things be any different in transition defense? Why did Krstic stay on the perimeter, close to Gagic – hardly a long range threat – as opposed to helping inside?

In other words, getting back on defense is not simply a matter of defenders running the floor. They also need to be aware of team defense principles even when the formation is altered in transition. On the other hand, the more time you have to figure it out, the easier it is to find the right place. This is why shot selection is such a crucial component of transition defense:

This a typically questionable shot selected by Milos Teodosic – a well-contested three with ten seconds on the clock. The fact that he missed is only part of the problem for CSKA. With Sasha Kaun rolling to the basket, Milutinov defending on the perimeter and Kinsey pushing the ball upcourt off his own defensive rebound, Partizan create two favourable matchups on the other end:

First, Kinsey backs down Teodosic, forcing Vorontsevich to help inside, giving up a wide open Bogdanovic three.The shot misses, but Partizan have back up. Milutinov finds himself matched up inside by Vladimir Micov. He seals him off, grabs the offensive board and slams it home. As Messina put it,

taking good shots (…) usually gives you a good chance (…) at the very least to get back and set up your defense’.

Teodosic proved him right on this possession. Then there is the question of effort:

This is another Partizan steal off a Vitaly Fridzon turnover (he is the CSKA player who’s out of bounds in the screenshot). Teodosic is in the left corner. Milenko Tepic is the Partizan player closest to him. Now here’s what happened a few seconds later:

Not only is Tepic wide open and makes a huge baseline jumper with less than a minute remaining in the game, but Fridzon has outrun Teodosic, even though he took off a couple of meters behind him. This is inexcusable and it didn’t happen only once:

A few minutes earlier, Micov thought that airing his grievances about a non-call to a ref nearby was more important than running back. This left Teodosic as the sole defender on the weak side. Kinsey made the extra pass, leading to a wide open corner three for Milosavljevic:

For Vujosevic, the main takeaway from this game should be that Partizan can afford to pick up the pace with little to no risk involved. After all, they have the second-highest turnover rate among Euroleague teams as it is. For Messina…well, he has already written about it:

Perfect preparation doesn’t exist. What you can do though is push your players and demand from them better and better understanding of the game as well as improvement in their ability to react and adjust.

Partizan Belgrade and Bayern Munich are two very different teams. Partizan play at a slow pace and have the third-worst offense in Euroleague. Bayern play at an above average pace and have the third-best offense in the competition. Partizan have the youngest roster in Euroleague. Bayern’s average player is near his prime years. Bayern have money to spend. Partizan need money to survive.

However, when these teams met at the Audi Dome last week, it became apparent that they share one common trait: they rely on power forwards who can’t spread the floor with their shooting. Joffrey Lauvergne, Djordje Gagic, Deon Thompson and Chevon Troutman practically invite opponents to help off them when they step outside the paint. As it has already been discussed, this deficiency tends to hurt pick and roll execution. However, the power forward is not the only frontline position which can contribute to spacing. Bayern look to John Bryant, their starting center, for help in this area:

The German team scored its first two baskets in this game by going to Thompson on the low block. Bryant was the one feeding him both times, after setting a ball screen and popping out on the perimeter. Nikola Milutinov (number eleven for Partizan) has to honour Bryant’s jumper and can’t help inside on Thompson who battles for position with Lauvergne. The French forward can’t afford to let his man catch the ball deep in the paint, so he tries to front him. The problem is that Milutinov doesn’t have his back. Bryant, an elite passer among Euroleague big men, finds Thompson with a textbook bounce pass. Layup.

Bryant’s passing can also be a valuable asset in transition. No one is going to mistake the American center for the modern day athletic big man who provides his team with an extra option in fast breaks. However, his passing skills serve him well when he trails his running teammates:

Partizan have gotten back in time to prevent a primary transition opportunity, but are forced to give up a mismatch inside, as Lauvergne jumps out to pick up Bryce Taylor at the wing, leaving Bogdan Bogdanovic to deal with Thompson in the paint. Once again, Bryant draws Milutinov away from the basket and makes sure that Thompson capitalizes on his size advantage with another assist.

Finally, Bryant’s perimeter skill set was also useful against Partizan’s 1-3-1 zone:

With three Partizan defenders clogging the middle of the floor, from the top of the key all the way to the baseline, Bayern needed an extra man on the soft spots of the zone, i.e. the wings. Bryant was that man and he found Robin Benzing for an open three at the far left corner. The shot missed, but this play indicates that a center who can pass should not be contained in his traditional role as a post up threat against zone schemes.

Perhaps none of these screenshots says anything new. High-low actions are hardly innovative stuff. The flex offense has required centers to pass the ball from beyond the arc since the 1970s. However, centers acting as playmakers outside the paint raise some interesting question about shot locations and efficiency.

Most of Bryant’s assists come from areas of the floor that are not associated with his position. Most of those assists lead to efficient shots – close-range attempts, three pointers and free throws. The problem is that he also does a lot of bad shooting from these areas – three out of his seven field goal attempts per game are either threes or twos outside the paint. His percentage in both categories is below 30%.However, if Bryant stopped taking those bad shots, a lot of Bayern’s possessions with Thompson on the floor would look like this:

On this Partizan possession Bryant defends the right way, according to advanced stats. He risks an open mid-range jumper by Milutinov and helps take away the interior, high-percentage threat posed by Lauvergne. Milutinov made that shot, but that’s not important. The main takeaway from this screenshot is that if Bryant’s man did not have to worry about his jumper, then the scoring opportunities inside for Thompson would be minimized and the risk of an errant pass in the crowded paint would increase (Bryant turns the ball over at a high rate as it is). At the same time, Thompson would have less room to do what he excels at – going after the offensive rebound:

Again, Lauvergne is forced to front Thompson. Again, no Partizan defender has his back. The high-low pass is not available and Bryant’s jumper misses, as numbers say it would. But Thompson has the opportunity to seal off his man and grab the offensive rebound. Had Milutinov rotated inside after the initial pick and pop action, instead of trying to get back to Bryant and losing his balance, the Bayern forward would have found it harder to attack the glass.

Therefore, Bryant should continue to play in the perimeter when paired with Thompson. Bayern coach Svetislav Pesic will have to take the good (assisted field goals and offensive rebounds inside, along with the occasional made jumper) with the bad (errant passes, missed jumpers). However, Bayern’s opponents should take a page out of Dragan Milosavljevic’s book and try to make the bad happen more often:

Whether he did it instinctively or by design, the Partizan forward defended like a proper stat geek on this play. Once Bryant received the pass on the pick and pop, Milosavljevic rotated halfway toward him, without fully committing to closing out on his jumper. When Bryant looked to pass to Taylor in the corner, Milosavljevic was able to cover the distance. It was enough to throw off the Bayern center and give Milutinov enough time to get back after helping on the ball screen. Eventually Bryant faked a shot and put the ball on the floor since he didn’t have a passing option. Bogdanovic picked up his dribble, leading to a transition opportunity for Partizan.

It’s enough to make you wonder whether Milutinov should not have respected Bryant’s jumper so much on these previous plays. Bayern’s frontline combinations force them to look for points and assists in low percentage areas of the floor. Bayern’s opponents should take advantage by turning Bryant into a volume perimeter shooter – at least until he makes enough of those.