Perhaps the most remarkable thing about Real Madrid trashing Barcelona at the Supercopa final was how ordinary it felt. This was an exhilarating performance – to the tune of 99 points, 57% shooting from beyond the arc and a 21-point win against the reigning Spanish champions – that somehow felt familiar, almost to be expected. Even on the defensive end, Madrid’s ability to generate twenty points off their opponents’ turnovers was noteworthy but not that surprising for a team that posted the second-highest steals percentage last Euroleague season.

Then again, Sunday’s triumph represented a major upgrade in the defensive efficiency of the Supercopa winners compared to the second half of last season, when on most possessions it seemed that they would either get a steal or get scored on. Containing Barcelona’s pick and roll game was key. Madrid did not appear to introduce any new defensive principles, but they were definitely more determined to meet the ball handler as far away from the basket as possible, in order to eliminate the mid-range threat posed by Huertas shots off one leg, Navarro bombitas and Tomic short rolls:

Last season, Pablo Laso seemed mostly reluctant to have his big men step outside the three – point line. This was not the case in the two Supercopa games. However, off the ball action was just as important, as the weak side defender closest to the top of the key was charged with bumping the roll man in order to give Madrid’s center enough time to recover. The best case scenario for this strategy can be summed up in the following screencap:

Rudy rotates toward Tomic just in time to pick up the steal, eliminating the sort of action that gave Madrid a bunch of problems last season. This is not to say that things worked out like this all of the time:

Such rotations tend to give up a fairly open three pointer from the weak side. Therefore, the help defender doing the bumping (KC Rivers on the above picture) is often forced to get back to his man before the Madrid center has recovered. On this play, Huertas made the bridge pass to Tomic, who converted inside. One solution for Madrid would be to have Reyes, suddenly turned into weak side defender, rotate deeper into the paint. Lampe’s three point percentage, coupled with the degree of difficulty on a potential crosscourt pass would justify that adjustment. In any case, Madrid have a couple of other options at their disposal, the first being a pretty straightforward switch:

It remains to be seen whether Madrid bigs can keep Europe’s most dangerous slashers in front of them long enough to make this strategy work. However, things got more interesting once the entry pass to the roll man connected:

It’s hard to tell at this early stage of the season whether Madrid blitzed Tomic with four defenders because of a conscious tactical decision or due to defensive rotations that are – quite understandably – a work in progress. Obviously, the resulting open three taken by Navarro is too steep a price to pay for taking away a high percentage shot inside. However, Laso’s experimentation with a switch defense was the most notable change in Madrid’s defensive set up. And in the long run it could help his teams minimize defensive rotations and  open threes, without risking too many attempts in the paint.

The second option could be provided by Gustavo Ayon. The Mexican center/forward does not stand out as a rim protector. In a three-game sample from the World Cup (against the Euroleague or NBA caliber talent of Lithuania, Australian and Slovenia), opponents made fourteen of the twenty one shots in the paint that were contested by Ayon. That’s a 66% mark, which is not completely awful, but still higher than the average percentage for shots at the rim taken by Euroleague teams last season (small sample disclaimer applies). Ayon is also quite foul prone, but he can hedge out, even against Goran Dragic:

Madrid haven’t been doing a whole lot of that under Laso, but it seems that they are looking for ways to rotate under their own terms. Preventing the ball handler on the pick and roll from turning the corner is one way to buy time for help defenders. Ayon also saw a few minutes at power forward, which is not a bad idea, given Madrid’s efficiency without a stretch four in their lineup and Nocioni’s habbit of getting beat by his man off the dribble. But his footwork against the pick and roll could be a valuable asset, even in limited minutes. With Marcus Slaughter seemingly the odd man out of Madrid’s deep front line, Laso needs a big man who can stop the ball. It remains to be seen whether Ayon can fill that role. ]]> http://www.in-the-game.org/in-non-moving-pictures-real-madrid-tinker-with-their-defense/feed/ 0 http://www.in-the-game.org/in-non-moving-pictures-how-france-shocked-spain/ http://www.in-the-game.org/in-non-moving-pictures-how-france-shocked-spain/#comments Thu, 11 Sep 2014 17:54:18 +0000 http://www.in-the-game.org/?p=25180

Shocking as Spain’s loss against France may have been, it can be explained by a pretty straightforward narrative. The seemingly formidable Spanish front line had one major weakness: they lacked a shooter that would spread the floor and allow his teammates to make the most of the Gasol brothers’ creativity from the low block and the high post. The French defense, anchored by Rudy Gobert, took away scoring opportunities inside and Spain’s struggles from the perimeter made life easier for Vincent Collet. On the other end, Diaw provided everything Spain missed from the power forward position and Thomas Heurtel made his hardcore fans proud.

Personally, I have no problem with this narrative, as long as we are looking for an answer about the end result. To find out the root causes of yesterday’s upset, though, we need to dig deeper. A closer look at the numbers reveals a couple of extra issues for Spain. Their post up offense was quite inefficient (6 points on 11 plays) and it failed to act as the starting point of the beautiful ball movement we have come to expect from Orenga’s team. Again, the lack of perimeter shooting partly explains Spain’s shortcomings, but France did not really flood the strong side with help defenders. In many cases, rushed shots and a lack of counter actions was the real issue:

On this play, Pau Gasol makes a proper read of the French defense and kicks the ball out to Sergio Rodriguez. One of the options for Chacho is a pull up jumper, but Antoine Diot recovers in time after helping down low. Still, Spain have a lot of time on the clock to look for another high percentage look. Only they don’t seem to look hard enough. Once Rodriguez receives the ball, everything freezes – there are no cuts, no attempted  pick and roll play. Eventually, S-Rod tries to get rid of his man off the dribble and once he fails to do so, fires an airball from behind the arc. It was hardly the only time Spain’s possessions featured too much dribbling and not much else.

Even though a pick and roll offense without a stretch four – Serge Ibaka was not the man for the job in this tournament – is a risky endeavor, it can work with a few tweaks. Spain was in desperate need of such adjustments but often went away too early from ideas that worked:

This image offers an interesting solution to spacing problems. Ibaka has been moved to the strong side, making harder for his man to cheat as a help defender inside. Had Florent Pietrus moved closer to the ball, Ibaka would have the opportunity to make a cut directly at the rim, where he can finish with authority. On the other end of the floor, Nic Batum has to stay home on Navarro and Mikael Gelabale lacks the size to stop the roll of Gasol, who draws a shooting foul. Why Spain didn’t run this play more often is a mystery.

The hosts of the tournament also failed to generate and capitalize on transition opportunities. Their defense in this game may look great on paper (France scored 65 points on the same number of possessions) but it didn’t really help their offense. In the first half, Spain got killed by the French movement off the ball, especially back door and baseline cuts. It is worth noting that on the group game between the two teams, France committed 15 turnovers, with Spain getting eleven steals, many of which lead to transition plays. Yesterday France had one more turnover, but Spain recorded seven steals less. Collet had his players ready to move when their opponents played the passing lanes or collapsed on the ball handler. As a result, the Spaniards often got caught looking at the ball.

On this screenshot, Diot looks like he is in trouble. He’s picked up his dribble and Pau has taken away the baseline. On a closer look, though, an opportunity emerges thanks to a lack of communication between Ricky Rubio and Ibaka:

Batum is free to cut along the baseline. Ibaka never sees his as he is concerned about  Gobert rolling to the basket and none of his teammates inform him of what’s going on behind his back. As this video makes clear, such breakdowns occurred often, especially in the first half. Spain’s defense improved in the second half, thanks to greater individual concentration and effort, combined with a more conservative approach which put a premium on rim protection. And there is nothing wrong with that, except Spain failed to force enough live ball turnovers which would rejuvenate their offense. In the end, one of the most fearsome fast break teams of the tournament finished the game with only four transition points.
Transition basketball became even less accessible for Spain due to their rebounding struggles. When the communication isn’t there and rotations are not sharp enough, defenders don’t get the opportunity to box out properly. Simply put, the French offense gave their defense a chance to excel, while the Spanish defense did very little to help their offense. Collet learned his lesson from the group game. Now he needs to do the same against another familiar opponent: Serbia.

As the semifinal of the European under 20 Championships between Turkey and Serbia raged on, it became apparent that Emircan Kosut and Nikola Jankovic were an odd match. Technically, they were both playing the same position – power forward. This where their similarities ended though. Jankovic is a bruiser. His game is all about establishing position inside, whether he is posting up or going after the offensive board. Kosut clearly struggled with the physicality of his opponent. He is taller, longer and jumps higher but those attributes didn’t really help him as Jankovic – who also happens to be one year older – pushed him around on the low block.

However, the winner of this match up is also the one facing the biggest transition process as a professional basketball player. Jankovic’s physical attributes are impressive, but not sufficient for life as an elite power forward in European basketball. Those nifty left hand finishes on the low block that served him so well in this tournament will not come as easily against the length of senior competition; his face up game is underdeveloped as he never seemed comfortable putting the ball on the floor; his shooting range is limited to the painted area (as evidenced by his horrendous free throw percentage). In short, the Serbian big man should consider making the jump to center. He might be undersized for a center, but undersized centers are all the rage in Euroleague (the NBA is out of the question at this point) and he could maximize his rebounding and interior scoring potential if he moves closer to the basket.

Kosut, on the other hand has fewer things to figure out. He needs to add a few pounds and turn his solid shooting mechanism into a consistent three point threat, but he is a power forward, regardless of the level of competition. His impressive wingspan would be a great asset in close outs against spread offense sets, while his ball handling skills could develop into an extra source of creativity for his team. Simply put, this match up captured the essence of junior tournaments: it doesn’t matter what you do or how much you produce. It’s how your game translates to a higher level.

This is not only about position, but also role. With Ioannis Papapetrou and some dude named Giannis Antetokounmpo out of the tournament, hosts Greece relied heavily on Eleftherios Bochorides for shot creation, but his inconsistent play raised a seemingly important position: which position is the best fit for Bochorides’ skills set? Given his size, which allows him to cover both guard positions, it could be argued that this is a debate worth having. However, thinking about basketball in purely positional terms is not particularly helpful for player development. Bochorides should be concerned more about his skills and role and less about his position. As a set-the-table point guard he needs to stop picking up his dribble at the wrong time and fumbling simple passes that get the offense going. As a shot-creating lead guard he must extend his passing range – most of his assists come on passes from the perimeter – in order to complement his athletic finishes at the rim. Once he gets to the paint he looks almost exclusively for his own shot instead of drawing the defense and dishing. And no matter where he plays he should add a higher release point to his jumper and stop fading to his right when he pulls up.

Similar questions about position could be raised about Jedi (I’m never calling him Cedi again) Osman, but his play made it clear that his role is well – defined: Osman creates offense with smooth, fluid forays to the hoop, draws a bunch of shooting fouls and works well within the flow of a given set. Then again context matters – Bochorides had less support in terms of both execution and talent around him. Osman, surrounded by pick and roll connoisseur Kartal Özmizrak, point forward Metecan Birsen and jack of all trades Tayfun Erülkü, could afford to pick his spots more than his Greek counterpart.

Speaking of context, this type of competition makes the evaluation of big man evaluation particularly tricky. Pick and roll guards are hard to find at this early age (Boris Dallo was particularly underwhelming in this area) and national teams do not spend enough time together to develop solid two-man game actions. This means that centers spend more time playing with their back to the basket. Results were mixed. Giorgos Diamantakos displayed solid footwork and a soft touch, but doesn’t really know how to read double teams. Mouhammadou Jaiteh had a physical advantage over just about every other center, but he would often try to go through the defense, a strategy that often led to turnovers or contested misses. Guillermo Hernangomez showed some promise as a face up threat – both as shooter and a passer. But he also took unnecessary risks and tended to drift occasionally. Still, it’s hard to project the development of that trio, given how little they were tested in pick and roll situations on both ends of the floor.

And there you have it. A few criteria on how to evaluate young players – position, role and context. Just don’t forget, this is still a game. This is why Matic Rebec, an undersized guard who could struggle to get his shot off against senior competition, was just as significant as any of the guys mentioned above. The reason why we care about such tournaments is simple – we’re looking for guys to watch in the future. Rebec, on the other hand was all about the present. I have no idea how his career is going to unfold – Aleksej Nikolic, his backcourt mate in Slovenia, looks like a better prospect thanks to his combination of size and shooting touch. But in mid-July 2014, Rebec reminded us why we are watching the game in the first place. It’s only fair, then, that this recap closes with him:

We’re talking about controlling the game – defensively and offensively. But in order to control the game, offense is always more important.

This is Dusan Ivkovic’s two cents on the debate about control in basketball. Duda said this in his trademark broken Greek during a press session back in December of 2010, eighteen months before his crowning achievement as a coach. Olympiacos’ triumph at the Istanbul final four was based on a monster defensive performance, but the Serbian legend thinks that control of the game is gained or lost on the other end of the floor. All this may explain his decision to sign Nenad Krstic at Anadolu Efes. Despite indications that he is moving past his prime (last season his per minute scoring and field goal percentage dropped sharply, while his reliance on assisted baskets increased), the former CSKA center remains an elite offensive player. His versatility as a scorer (pick and roll finisher, post up threat, spot up shooter from mid-range) could help ease the growing pains of a team going through a major rebuilding phase. Efes have a lot of things to figure out. Control is not easy to maintain under such circumstances. Krstic’s efficient scoring could help in this area.

Then again, Ivkovic did not pick Krstic simply for philosophical reasons. Trust is obviously a factor. The two men have worked together with considerable success in the Serbian national team. Krstic carried Serbia’s offense at the 2013 Eurobasket, Duda’s last tournament as the coach of the national team, en route to an unexpected World Cup berth (by the way, can we please stop calling it the World Cup? Football fans are laughing at us). Ivkovic knows how to maximize Krstic’s talents in a plethora of pick and roll and post up actions. But what about defense?

At this point Krstic is a very limited defender. In their latest Euroleague campaign, CSKA conceded 103 points per a hundred possessions with him on the floor. It was an above average performance, but this number does not tell the whole story. Not only did the Russian powerhouse transformed into an elite defensive team when Krstic sat on the bench (their 97.7 defensive rating during those stretches would top the Euroleague over a full season), but their offensive productive often took a hit as Ettore Messina tried to cover his center’s back by deploying a few unconventional lineups. Kyle Hines, arguably a top-3 center in 2012-2013, played 363 of his 549 Euroleague minutes at power forward (injuries to Viktor Khryapa also played a part in Messina’s planning). This arrangement not only led CSKA to underperform on offense, where spacing was an issue, but also prevented them from maximizing their potential on defense: both Hines and Sasha Kaun, the other option at center, were clearly more effective defenders at the five position. Simply put, Krstic was the odd man of the CSKA frontline.

Of course this doesn’t necessarily mean that he will be a bad fit at Efes. Reliable big men don’t grow on trees, as evidenced by the hefty buy out sums paid in previous offseasons for the likes of Stanko Barac and Luka Zoric (yes, Zoric did more to justify his deal). Still, Ivkovic must know that Krstic’s defense raises some valid concerns – at least that’s what the table below says:

Table: Nenad Krstic: Pick and Roll Defense at Eurobasket 2013

*play: a possession involving a pick and roll set defended by Krstic and ending with a shot, a turnover, a shooting foul, or a putback attempt.

My loyal readers (all three of them) will probably remember that measuring pick and roll defense is a tricky notion – the two man game is defended by at least two players. Therefore, blaming Krstic for all the baskets Serbia allowed on the plays recorded on this table would not be terribly accurate. However, these numbers demonstrate two significant challenges for Efes:

1. Serbia had the fourth-worst defensive rating at the 2013 Eurobasket and some of their worst performances on that end of the floor (against Spain, Italy and Ukraine), coincided with their opponents attacking Krstic on the pick and roll.
2. Krstic would find himself at the epicenter of such actions fifteen times per game. Hiding your center’s defensive deficiencies in the pick and roll era is extremely hard.

With that in mind, let’s see how Duda used the newest Efes center on pick and roll defense:

Flat defense

This was Serbia’s go to strategy with Krstic on the floor:

The Serbian center would drop back to the free throw line, with his teammate going over the screen. In theory, this is the best way to prevent opponents from exploiting Krstic’s limited mobility. In these situations big men are required to slow down the ball handler and get back to the roll man without having to cover a great distance. Ivkovic also likes this set up because it allows his team to keep defensive rotations at a minimum. And that’s a good thing according to the Efes coach, whose defensive philosophy can be explained by his criticism of pick and roll-heavy offensive playbooks:

Now we all play pick and rolls, usually as a two-man game. I’m afraid this strategy is ruining basketball. In pick and rolls there’s only one player passing. The other four are watching.

Notice how Duda says ‘we’. No coach can afford to ignore the advantages created by the pick and roll (bigs stepping out at the expense of rim protection, perimeter guys rotating at the expense of defensive balance). However, Ivkovic’s concern about the impact of such actions on ball movement also inform his defensive approach. His main goal is to isolate the ball handler from his teammates by taking away passing lanes toward the roll man and having the other three defenders stay home on shooters and cutters.

At 2013 Eurobasket Krstic often struggled to hold his end of the deal. In the picture above his angle is not ideal, as he doesn’t take away the driving lane to the left of the ball handler. His footwork does not allow him to make up for his poor initial positioning and Serbia concedes a close range attempt:

Of course not all is lost at this point. Krstic’s teammates have managed to take away all other options, which means that the Serbian center can focus on a traditional big man task: challenging a shot at the rim. Unfortunately, he is not very good at it either, even at games where Serbia’s defense was at its best. The table above indicates that Kristic’s defensive performance against Lithuania was one of his best at the tournament. However, Mantas Kalnietis was able to attack him in pick and roll actions during the fourth quarter. Krstic could not stop the Lithuanian guard outside the paint, nor significantly alter his shots at the rim. This sequence against Ukraine tells the same story: the high percentage shot missed, but it was the shot Serbia’s opponents wanted. This is why the play resulted in an offensive rebound and a putback, with Krstic out of the picture:

To sum up: Krstic doesn’t really stop the ball away from the basket and is not much of an intimidator inside. Therefore, a flat coverage can only work if the Efes guard defending the ball handler can go around a screen quick enough and/or if opponents are baited into taking low percentage mid-range jumpers off the dribble (hey, it could work against Keith Langford). But what happens if the ball handler is a dangerous shooter from beyond the arc?

Hedge out

It has already been mentioned how Ivkovic is not comfortable with extensive defensive rotations. But when the ball handler has no qualms about pulling up coming off the ball screen and is not explosive enough to make defenses pay for crowding him, it is worth deploying a more aggressive strategy: having your big man meet him at the three point line, with help defenders covering his back and the guard going over the screen:

Again, Krstic displays poor positioning and anticipation, as he doesn’t push the ball handler away from the basket. His limited athleticism obviously plays a part, but doesn’t explain everything. Darjus Lavrinovic – not exactly the archetype of an athletic big man – demonstrates what Krstic does wrong:

Unlike Lavrinovic, Krstic allows ball handlers to turn the corner coming off the ballscreen. This leaves him vulnerable to pocket passes toward the roll man and gives the opposing guard to split any double teams the defense might try. In other words, help defenders have to take on more responsibilities and act faster, as defense on the ball hardly slows down the offensive execution.

Switch

We don’t need a screenshot for this one: the big man steps out to play the ball handler one on one, while the defending guards fronts the roll man, denying an entry pass in the paint. Pretty straightforward stuff. Even though this strategy is usually reserved for more mobile centers, Duda had Krstic switch in late clock situations or when opponents run 4/5 pick and rolls, with the likes of Linas Kleiza and Luigi Datome handling the ball. This approach might throw opponents off and cause guards to overdribble – remember how Madrid struggled to make the correct reads against the switching Olympiacos defense? But it could also present an extra challenge for Efes as Kristic tends to lose guards once they pass the ball. Take this play, against Bo McCalebb:

While you would probably expect Bo to blow right past Krstic on the switch, the Serbian center actually does a pretty good job of leading him toward the help. Once McCalebb gives up the ball however, Krstic gets lost in defensive no man’s land:

Bo makes it to the left corner, with Krstic drifting behind Vladimir Stimac on the low post. The open three dropped, as no Serbia player closes out on the shooter.

Changing the discussion

With Nemanja Bjelica the only conventional power forward in Serbia’s roster last summer, Ivkovic often deployed twin tower lineups: Krstic would share the frontcourt with fellow centers Djordje Gagic or Stimac. This would allow Duda to hide him as a help defender against pick and rolls. Could a similar strategy work at Efes?

Pairing Krstic with Stephane Lasme sounds promising. Both are productive as mid-range shooters, a skill which could help Efes deal with spacing issues of lineups that do not feature a stretch four. On the other end of the floor, Lasme is a trustworth pick and roll defender. However, the answer in not so simple. First of all Lasme is also moving past his prime and was extremely foul prone last season. Will Efes have enough depth to get away with playing their two main centers at the same time? Also, Krstic as a help defender is not exactly a safe bet:

This is Krstic as power forward. His job on this play is to rotate toward the roll man if the ball handler finds him. Given the short distance it shouldn’t be a problem, right? All Krstic has to do is take a couple of steps to the left and raise his hands. Well, see for yourself:

There is no type of pick and roll defense that allows a team to completely avoid rotations. Duda’s schemes are designed to have such rotations take place on his own terms – late on the shot clock and after his players have taken away most passing options. Still, rotations need to be executed properly. More often than not Krstic does not deliver.

Of course the Serbian center will have considerable help at Efes. Dontaye Draper and Dogus Balbay are excellent defenders on the ball, who could drastically reduce his own work load by recovering quickly after the screen has been set. Lasme is very useful as insurance policy. And help defenders can always make a difference. However, Duda has his work cut out for him. Efes spent a significant amount on a player who seems to be productive only on one side of the floor. And even though the Turkish club has money to spend, its resources are not limitless. One has to wonder whether the could get better value for the money. But right now that’s a rhetorical question. What matters more is how Ivkovic is going to find a way around all those defensive issues.

European player recruiting is a game of season averages, arguably a game of early-season averages. There is a recency bias in watching basketball, but statistically, who do you think is the talk of the league for most of the season: The point guard who averages 14 points and 6 assists in the first half of the season and 8 and 3 in the second, or the guy with 8 and 3 in the first and 14 and 6 in the second?

Just because it’s fun, here is a selection of ten players who outperformed their early-season per game averages, and no — that does not necessarily mean improved performance. Players had to play 10 games before and 10 games after the 1st of February for the same club to qualify. There’s a number of players who changed teams and improved; those were not in the group of players I looked at.

(There’s more, and there’s an equal number of players who dropped post-January, but I’m not going to mention them here.)

Kyle Kuric, Estudiantes, 24.7 years, Shooting Two-Guard

Kuric played college ball in Louisville and is an Estudiantes player since summer 2012. Kuric is finishing his 2013/14 campaign strong, averaging 17.1 points per game on an otherwordly 1.21 points per possession and 45.5 percent three point shooting on over six attempts per game since the beginning of February. He had shown late-season improvement in 2012-13 already, which was largely due to an increase in playing time.

Daniel Theis, ratiopharm Ulm, 22.1 years, Mobile Power Forward/Center

Not having started playing basketball until the age of 15 but adding to his game step by step ever since, Theis is improving at a frantic pace now. The athletic 4/5 was caught struggling for playing time in a deep frontcourt rotation of Keaton Nankivil, Ian Hummer/Greg Mangano (power forward), Matt Howard and Trent Plaisted (center) early in the season but more than came through as the season progressed. Theis not just scored the ball better post-January, but rebounding also jumped in increased minutes, plus a five game stretch of nearly three blocks per game in late February/early March. Points per possession increased from 0.919 (before February) to 1.018 (since) despite just 29.6 percent three point shooting in the second half of the season. Theis has an out clause in his contract, and a move to a BBL powerhouse this summer would not shock anyone.

Clint Capela, Chalon-sur-Saone, 20.0 years, Defensive/Finishing Center

Improvement in Capela’s per game averages is a lot about playing time, but the jump in minutes is significant in itself. Not every young (especially young, “defensive”) big can go 27 minutes per game through a period of three and a half months (I would argue Jusuf Nurkic can not at this point) as Capela has done since the beginning of February. Capela’s per minute production has not collapsed with increased playing time (PPP has slightly improved from 1.052 to 1.081), except for a significant drop in blocked shots: He’s only blocking half as many shots (Oct-Jan vs Feb-May) despite playing 8 1/2 more minutes a game. A little-explored but not unusual pattern, with foul trouble considerations likely playing their part.

J’Covan Brown, KAOD, 24.3 years, Scoring Point Guard

The young American scoring guard is posting 19.8 points per game and 1.127 points per possession since the beginning of February, which is top-notch for a high-usage shot creator. Brown averaged 20 points a game in his final season in Texas but had a difficult first A1 season in Rhetymno. Brown’s grind should literally pay off this summer.

Ramon Galloway, Fraport Skyliners, 23.3 years, Scoring/Playmaking Two-Guard

A difficult rookie season for Galloway, who was released by the club (citing “disciplinary reasons”) just as he was starting to produce as a rare shot creator on this homogenous but still young and limited Frankfurt team. Arriving from Igokea in November, Galloway had produced just 5.8 points per game (0.706 PPP) in 21 minutes per game in the BBL pre-February, but posted 13.2 points per game (0.928 PPP) in 28.2 minutes per game since, showing plenty of promise.

Thomas Heurtel, Laboral Kutxa, 25.1 years, Playmaking Point Guard

Heurtel, who hardly needs introduction, is pass-first playmaker by choice not by limitation and switched into scoring mode in the second part of the season as Walter Hodge was replaced by the passing-minded Guiseppe Poeta. Heurtel’s assist to field goal attempt ratio dropped from 0.87 (pre-February) to 0.62 (since) and his scoring increased by nearly five points per game despite just a 1.4 increase in minutes per game. He scored the ball on a very strong 1.058 PPP since the beginning of February, up from 0.875 in lower usage.

Erick Green, Montepaschi Siena, 23.0 years, Scoring Point/Two-Guard

Erick Green led the NCAA in scoring for most of the 2012-13 season while playing for Virginia Tech, but failed to average double figures as a rookie for Montepaschi Siena in the October-January period, averaging 9.2 points per game in 21.2 minutes per game in Serie A games (Euroleague games are excluded). He’s averaging an excellent 15.1 points in 25.8 minutes a game since the beginning of February, all on 1.177 PPP, teaming up with Marquez Haynes to fill the scoring void left by Daniel Hackett’s departure in what has been a turbulent season in Siena. A major plus for him has been his ability to produce points without turning the ball over, averaging just a little over one turnover a game in February-May.

Lukas Festr, USK Praha, 19.8 years, Point Guard

Teenage playmaker Lukas Festr, a long-time presence in Czech youth national teams, exploded in the second half of the season, logging large minutes at the expense of another young Czech, Michal Sotnar. Festr averaged 13.7 points per game since the beginning of February (including a late five-game span where he averaged nearly 20/7), while scoring on a solid 0.947 points per possessions. He also averaged 5.2 assists and 3.6 rebounds per game. USK are an all-Czech team coached by former Bamberg, Braunschweig, Gießen head coach Ken Scalabroni. They finished 13-29 in the NBL’s regular season. The level of play behind still unbeaten Nymburk (who rank 22nd in the Euroleague/Eurocup club ranking) is suspect, though.

O’Darien Bassett, Bourg-en-Bresse, 28.0 years, Scoring/Playmaking Point Guard

This might well be a random bulge in Bassett’s season, but the 28-year-old has been killing the Pro B in the second half of the season, leading Bourg-en-Bresse into the Pro B playoff semifinals, where they are leading Evreux 1-0 (Game 2 was in progress at the time of writing). He’s been averaging 18 points and 1.151 PPP (which is excellent in shot creator context) since the beginning of February, while dishing out 5 assists per game and keeping turnovers (2.2) fairly limited. Bassett averaged 11.8 points per game on 0.915 PPP in 26 games before February.

Kyryl Natyazhko, Azovmash, 23.5 years, Power Forward

Plenty of foreign players fled Ukraine in early 2014, creating a void that was left to be filled by home-grown talent. Natyazhko had an eye-catching Eurobasket 2013 performance which he failed to back up in the first half of the Ukranian Superleague season. His playing time jumped from 11.2 (before February) to 26.2 minutes per game (since). He scored 13.2 points per game since the beginning of February, though against weakened competition. This is more about increased playing time than improved performance, even if Natyazhko did push his possession efficiency from 0.855 points per possession (before February) to 0.986 (since).

Pablo Laso and Xavi Pascual may come across as polar opposites when it comes to coaching philosophies, but it could be argued that the styles of Ettore Messina and David Blatt are just as different. The Italian favourite and the American underdog seem to hold contrasting views in most aspects of the game – size, pace, offensive principles, defensive flexibility and so on. This is why the less hyped of the two semifinals in Mian, between CSKA Moscow and Maccabi Tel Aviv, could be just as intriguing as the clásico that everyone has been waiting for.

Then again you wouldn’t know that judging from the two top – 16 game between the two powerhouses. CSKA destroyed Maccabi in Moscow and pulled off a gutsy win at Tel Aviv despite  - or thanks to, if you are one of those people – the absence of Milos Teodosic (Maccabi were also without a key player in Devin Smith). This why the Russians should be treated as the favorites, even after two embarrassing homes losses on the eve of the final four against Lokomotiv Kuban, which had Messina exploring the depths of human nature. However, CSKA’s VTB League struggles have served as reminders about certain holes which can be exploited by Maccabi.

For a Messina-coached team, CSKA have occasionally appeared shockingly incompetent in transition defense, a deficiency which could play right into Maccabi’s free flowing offensive tendencies. At the same time, they have also looked vulnerable in the perimeter. Not only have they allowed Loko to make 15 of 32 three pointers in the first two games of their playoffs series, but CSKA have also gotten away with giving up a bunch of open looks from beyond the arc to other opponents (the quarterfinals against Panathinaikos offer many good examples of this issue). Simply put, they might not be as lucky against an opponent that ranks third in three-point percentage.

On the other hand, Maccabi have even more problems to work out regarding their own defense. CSKA scored at will in both games, as their ball movement, size and, somewhat unexpectedly, speed seemed to overwhelm the Israeli champs. At Tel Aviv Aaron Jackson, Sonny Weems and Kyle Hines had a field day on the open court, as CSKA scored 15 transition points (after a Maccabi miss or turnover, within the first 8 seconds of the shot clock) in the first half. With Maccabi turning the ball over at nearly a quarter of their possessions this sort of effectiveness is pretty reasonable. Therefore, Blatt will need better decision making from his ball handlers. Joe Ingles is one of them:

One of the foundations of CSKA’s defense is leading slashers into the interior help without giving up passing lanes. In other words, shot creators need to be patient to figure out what this defense is giving them. This is where Ingles gets it wrong on this play.  He picks up his dribble too early, doesn’t recognize Fridzon helping from the strong side and drives straight into Sasha Kaun, eventually trying to force a pass to Alex Tyus, which is picked up by Hines and leads to a jump ball. The Australian should watch some tape of Tyrece Rice from the same game:

With Kaun dropping back on the pick and roll, Rice can afford to keep his dribble alive and get in the paint. Meanwhile Tyus has gotten underneath the rim, preventing the CSKA center from  fully committing on the ball. This more patient approach offers two advantages. First, Rice gets a good look at one of his patented floaters (which he made on this play). Second, the CSKA defense is forced to move – notice how Victor Khryapa slides toward the paint to help the helping Kaun, freeing up Guy Pnini on the left wing. Maccabi like to keep opponents on their toes and taking advantage of every opening, regardless of how many seconds are left on the shot clock. Against CSKA’s length, however, Blatt should prepare his players to let the defense come to them.

In a half court setting, Maccabi’s defense was dominated inside and out. CSKA could pass over the defense and rotations left a lot to be desired. Looking ahead to Friday, Blatt needs to do a better job of exposing the spacing issues which arise when Kyle Hines plays power forward.

In plays like this one, David Blu simply needs to leave Hines all alone behind the three point line and help the undersize Tyus take away the passing lane toward Kaun (who scored on this possession). Maccabi should be better prepared to defend in such situations, which include double teams when CSKA’s big perimeter players are posting up:

Here Blu and Ricky Hickman have just trapped Sonny Weems on the low block. The ball is kicked out to Hines and Pnini performs a typical rotation toward the ball, leaving Yogev Ohayon in charge of two shooters in the weak side. Hines swings the ball to Khryapa, extra pass to Jackson, open corner three made. On Friday, Pnini should probably stay closer to Khryapa, leaving Hickman and Blu to deal with the only threat posed by Hines on this area of the floor – a drive toward the basket. Maccabi could also adopt a more practical approach when they have to deal with Hines as a screener:

It would be surprising if Maccabi defended so aggressively against the pick and roll, even when the ball is in the hands of more aggressive slasher than Vitaly Fridzon. Joe Ingles in particular should be quite effective as a switch defender when Hines rolls to the basket. On this play the trap backfires once again, as Hines receives the pass from Fridzon and proceeds to immediately find Kaun inside. Speaking of CSKA’s pick and roll, the limitations of Maccabi’s centers could be a deciding point of the semifinal:

Sofoklis Schortsanitis hedges out against Weems, freeing up Nenad Krstic for one of his patented mid-range jumpers. Once again the dominoes in Maccabi fall: Ohauyon covers the Serbian center, who finds Jackson on the corner for another made three. It looks like a safer bet would be to force CSKA’s ball handlers – especially Jackson and Teodosic who should be less than fully fit on Friday – to look for their own shot off the dribble, an option that Messina doesn’t really aprove.  Another option for Blatt is his trademark matchup zone, which did not make a difference in the previous two games. CSKA’s size had a lot to with it:

The passing angle on this Weems/Kaun pick and roll is not ideal, but the ball still gets to the Serbian center, as Tyus’ positioning does not allow him to make up for his size disadvantage. Again, though, Hines’ man (Ingles on this play) should have rotated deeper into the paint. On another play, Hines was the one creating the mismatch, as he found Hickman in front of him at the top of the key, as part of Maccabi’s zone formation. Hines cut toward the rim, forcing the American guard to follow him inside (and foul him). Had Blu picked up Hines, Ohayon would once again find himself between two shooters on the weak side:

It is pretty clear then that CSKA can create more problems inside and out. This is why they are the favorites. At the same time, Blatt can afford to take some risks that could  change the discussion: Maccabi will probably allow some CSKA shots that could reduce the significance of X’s and O’s and test the Russian team’s character and confidence. Needless to say, all champions need to answer this call at some point.

May 16th will mark the fourth time this season that Real Madrid face Barcelona. The stakes will be higher, the game will take place outside of Spain and a couple of injuries could alter the rotations of both teams. However, the first three versions of this season’s clásico offer plenty of material for a Euroleague semifinal preview.

Numbers indicate that the two Spanish giants find it difficult to stop each other from scoring.  Madrid’s triumph against the blaugrana at the London final four was based on an inspired defensive performance in the closing minutes of the game, but the Spanish champs have not been able  to reproduce it this season. Barcelona scored a little over 106 points per a hundred possessions in their three meetings with the second-best defense in Euroleague. This number could have easily been a lot more impressive had they not missed 12 free throws – not to mention a few great looks from behind the arc – at the Copa Del Rey final. The main reason for Barcelona’s success on the offensive end is their pick and roll execution:

Marcelinho Huertas in particular has been a force in the middle of floor, making shots and dishing out assists in the area which extends from the three-point line to the free throw line. Madrid’s defense enables him to get to his spots, as their big men are limited to a “show and get back” defense which hardly stops the ball and fails to close the passing lane toward the roll man. And when the weak side defender rotates deep to help the helping center, Barcelona have been able to generate more than a few open looks from the corner and the wing. Madrid have tried to counter with a more aggressive approach, designed to prevent Huertas and the other Barcelona ball handlers from turning the corner and getting to the middle of the floor. This strategy opens up a driving lane on the opposite side of the ball screen, but it provides help defenders with more time in order to complete their rotations. However, stopping the ball is still a challenge for Pablo Laso:

The possible absence of Dontaye Draper (who fractured his arm in game 1 of the playoffs) will certainly impact Madrid’s defense on the ball. In any case however, it is evident that the merengues rotate more than they would like to. Ante Tomic is very dangerous on the short roll, both as a passer and a finisher a few feet away from the hoop. This means that Madrid center need to be very quick on the feet. Sounds like a job for Marcus Slaughter, who has had an uneven Euroleague campaign but remain the best pick and roll defender of his team.

Then again, Madrid could win this game by simply outscoring Barcelona. Xavi Pascual has not managed to build the defensive wall of previous season, but his team still gets more stops than most. This has not been the case against Madrid, who continue to capitalize on a series of mismatches, making the blaugrana defense look average at best. The most talked about example of this trend is the way Laso attacks Juan Carlo Navarro, who could be in for a long night given his questionable fitness after the leg injury he picked up against Galatasaray. But the power forward position has proved an even more noticeable chink in Barcelona’s armor:

No matter who plays the four for the blaugrana, and no matter what Madrid run on their offense, Nikola Mirotic and Felipe Reyes have been devastating. Erazem Lorbek, Bostjan Nachbar and Macej Lampe have looked clueless for the most part: they can’t defend the pick and roll, are not serviceable as help defenders, do not box out effectively, need all the help they can get in post up actions and cannot keep up when their opponents attack off the dribble. They are only so many schemes that Pascual can draw up in order to cover for those deficiencies. Given the familiarity between the two teams, there is very little room for tactical surprises. Both coaches have implemented at times their favourite variations of zone defense – Laso going with a zone press led by Slaughter’s defense on the ball and Pascual bring out his trusted 2-3 formation:

In these situations, Barcelona run the risk of being spread thin on the perimeter. All it takes is a quick entry pass, and suddenly the zone has a weakside problem:

On this play, Slaughter found Mirotic on the far corner for an open three. It is clear that Huertas should have rotated toward Carroll on the right wing. But if one looks at the big picture, Pascual’s zone has the same objective as the Olympiacos switch defense which slowed down Madrid for two games and a half: always have a defender in front of Madrid’s perimeter shot creators and force the big men to make more decisions than usual. Even when Barcelona were defending man to man, Pascual often tried to crowd the ball handler:

Again, this approach is not without risks, given Madrid’s efficiency from three-point range. And Barcelona’s big men are not mobile enough to chase the likes of Sergio Rodriguez in the perimeter for extended stretches. But those blitz tactics could pay dividends in key moments of a knockout game. Madrid, on the other hand can probably take more risks with Barcelona’s perimeter shooting, given the inconsistency of the blaugrana in this area. But they still need to improve their pick and roll defense.

The fact that there are no secrets between those two teams could actually make this semifinal even more exciting: if a tactical adjustment by either coach makes a noticeable difference, then it will have to be something really special. The individual effort which will be required by the players of both teams in order to overcome such a well-prepared opponent should also be remarkable. And overall, this promises to be a balanced game. Madrid have been the best team in Europe all season, but Barcelona  lost the most important duel so far ( that would be the Copa Del Rey final) due to their own shortcomings, not because they were outplayed. And while it is understandable that watching the same group of teams compete for the Euroleague title year after year can take away some of the excitement, this game should be special.

George Rowland and sJacas discuss the Dario Šarić and Eurocup finals.

Podcast (give it some time – it does load; right-click to download)

Madrid had done their homework

Coming into the playoffs, Olympiacos lineups featuring Bryant Dunston at power forward were particularly prolific on offense, to the tune of more than 120 points per a hundred possessions. It’s safe to say that this number dropped somewhat after a disastrous start to the game for the champs, who were -12 with that old school formation on the floor. The American center moved to the four during the top 16, as a replacement to the injured Giorgos Printezis. Opponents were often caught off guard, allowing Dunston to dive toward the hoop from the weakside, finishing strong at the rim and pick up a few transition-initiating steals at the perimeter. Pablo Laso had apparently watched enough tape to not fall for this trick.

Vassilis Spanoulis scored zero points and had zero assists at the painted area in the first half. Even though he was perceived (by some unreliable analysts, at least) to have an advantage over Giannis Bouroussis, Olympiacos scored just six points in seven pick and roll plays that had the Reds captain going up against the Greek center. The pictures below explain this number: With Brent Petway picking up two early fouls, spreading the floor  was an impossible task. This was especially true when Dunston was the second big man, as Nicola Mirotic was free to roam toward Spanoulis:

Even though there was no room inside, with the aggressive Madrid defense on the ball creating havoc, Bartzokas should not completely ditch this lineup. After all Printezis is coming off a very serious injury and his conditioning is a mystery. Petway is foul prone. However, Dunston seems to match up better against Reyes, whether he is banging for position inside or taking advantage of the Spaniard’s limited mobility at defense (at least compared to the seemingly omnispresent Mirotic). Reyes got in Petway’s head, who seemed overmatched at the post, but can keep up with Mirotic outside, while also keeping weakside defenders honest.

Olympiacos picked more than one poison

Madrid on the other hand, had no spacing issues. They hit their threes and despite an off night by Sergio Rodriguez scored enough points inside off the pick and roll. With Olympiacos turning the ball over at an alarming rate, a popular talking point has been pace and how Madrid controlled it. This was true in the first quarter, when the merengues scored six points on four transition plays. However, they were as effective in a half court setting  as the 67-possession pace required them to be. The Reds tried to deal with Madrid pick and rolls by having their big men hedge out. The good news was that S-Rod turned it over twice in the second quarter when faced with this strategy. The bad news was that soft spots kept popping up, inside and out. The best offense in Europe had no problem taking advantage:

With Shermadini stepping outside and Bouroussis rolling to the basket, the Olympiacos power forward has to rotate inside. Mirotic is wide open and proceeds to showcase the full repertoire – pump fake and cross-court hockey assist to Llull who swings it to Rudy. Open three. Madrid also capitalized on the 1-4 pick and roll, as Mirotic and Reyes combined for six points on four plays. In one of those plays, Rudy’s underrated passing ability (underrated even by Rudy himself sometimes) was on display:

Very few point guards in Europe could connect with the roll man from that angle. However, this picture also capture a hole in Olympiacos’ hedge out defense: Dunston often allows the ball handler to turn the corner. One counter would be a deeper rotation by Shermadini, risking a three by Bouroussis or Mejri. But even that option is not available when the ball handler splits the hedge out:

Dunston has been a dominant shot blocker, but his footwork is often questionable. Therefore he often relies on the work done by perimeter defenders on the ground in order to make the most of his ability above the rim. Against Madrid’s explosiveness, he simply has to do more, or risk giving up more three point plays like this one, materialized by Rodriguez at the rim. The same goes for all Olympiacos centers, even when Madrid deploy their non-stretch four lineups:

In theory, Reyes’ limited shooting range would allow a more aggressive approach, as help defenders would have to cover less ground. This is why Printezis is stationed under the basket. However, the hedging defender has to force the ball handler away from the hoop, otherwise Olympiacos guards will not have enough time to recover. This is exactly what happens here, as Rodriguez turns the corner, putting Printezis in an one-against-two situation, which ends up in a Reyes layup.

A couple of potential openings

Simply put, Madrid’s run in the first half was based on a diverse offensive portfolio and a keen awareness of Olympiacos’ spacing issues. The Reds countered with a stretch of hot shooting. Looking ahead to Game 2, Madrid’s success seems more sustainable. However, Olympiacos could resort to certain actions that caused their opponents’ aggressiveness on the ball or against Spanoulis to backfire:

It’s a safe bet that Laso will try to help Spanoulis’ man as much as possible when he’s fighting through picks off the ball. That’s what Rudy does here, opening up a driving lane which results in a Papapetrou layup. Matt Lojeski should also look for such openings, as Olympiacos needs more points from him. There are also some opportunities created by Madrid’s pick and roll defense:

No matter how crowded the paint gets, Olympiacos power forwards should find plenty of room beyond the arc. This is the case with Printezis on this play. There are two ways to take advantage of this space. If the defenders stay inside, Printezis – and Petway – have to shoot. If their man closes out on them, then they have to look for the roll man. Both Bouroussis and Mejri should have some trouble recovering in time. If the ball handler makes a quick pass to the strong side, then there is a possibility for more possessions like this, which concluded with a Printezis-Simmons alley oop.

A major question is whether Olympiacos are actually fit enough to take advantage of the few opportunities created by Madrid’s defense. Spanoulis got to the rim on a couple of plays, but couldn’t finish like he usually does. Has he made a full recovery from his recent knee injury? Printezis performed like the prolific scorer that he is, but he ran out of breath rather quickly, in his first game back from a rib/lower back/Olympiacos-medical-staff-can’t-really-say injury. Perperoglou is sick and likely to sit out game two. Madrid would be a handful even if the champs were in top form. Setting aside Xs and Os then, the question is how deep they can dig to make this series competitive.

Here’s the problem with paradigm shifts: they are often associated with too many gray areas to neatly fit an analytical model. Take Euroleague centers. It could be argued that the omnipresence of pick and roll sets in a modern European offense has changed the way the position is played- size is less important than explosiveness and agility, footwork in the post has taken a backseat to defensive footwork. This is why undersized Olympiacos dominated inside against CSKA Moscow in last season’s final four. This is why Stephane Lasme won the Defensive Player of the Year award. This is why every Real Madrid opponent this season secretly hopes that Pablo Laso will keep playing Giannis Bouroussis over Marcus Slaughter (or maybe I’m just prejudiced against Bouroussis).

However, the narrative is not linear. Injuries, chemistry issues and a few good seven – footers have kept the frontcourt traditions alive. This season, CSKA find themselves in one of those gray areas: Nenad Krstic is mostly old-school: he can score with his back to the basket, but lacks the footspeed to properly defend pick and rolls. The only ‘modern’ aspect of his game is his shooting range, which extends to the long two pointer area. Kyle Hines is on the other end of the spectrum. Sasha Kaun is somewhere in between – not as polished on the low post as Krstic, but a much more effective pick and roll defender and a more explosive finisher. When Hines signed with CSKA last summer, there were a few questions about whether Ettore Messina could find enough minutes for all three. The answer was simple: with Viktor Khryapa struggling and Andrei Vorontsevich in and out of the doghouse, Hines, an emblematic figure in Euroleague’s positional revolution, has seen most of his minutes at power forward.The following screencap from their recent game at Madrid suggests that this is not a particularly good idea for CSKA’s offense:

This is a typical issue for any pick and roll offense without a stretch four (or lack of shooting in one of the three perimeter positions): at least one help defender – Mirotic in the instance – can cheat off his man and help inside (also notice Rudy’s aggressive and somewhat risky rotation toward Pargo from the strong side). CSKA have been deploying two-center lineups since last season, so they can run some pretty effective counters, taking advantage of Krstic’s mid-range productivity.

This side pick and roll starts with the Serbian center in the paint. Once Hines rolls to the basket Krstic moves at the free throw line. Reyes stays with him, as he has to honour his jumper. This leaves the two defenders guarding the pick and roll, Rudy and Mirotic in a tough place. If Mirotic hedges out, Hines has a free path to the basket; if Rudy goes under the screen he risks an open three by Vladimir Micov; and if Mirotic stays flat, with Rudy going over the screen, the former could find himself in the middle of a Hines-Micov two-man game. This why Madrid resorts to a switch, with Rudy overplaying Hines:

The only problem is that none of his teammates has his back (perhaps Llull should have rotated deeper, given the distance a potential pass to Fridzon would have to cover). Hines receives the lob pass, is fouled and goes to the free throw line. Another way for CSKA around spacing issues has been mixing pick and rolls with certain principles of the flex offense:

Weems has the ball on the top of the key. Hines is an option as a screen setter, which means that Mirotic can’t roam around. In other words, CSKA are trying a different approach to spreading the floor through their power forward. Fridzon is the one taking advantage of that space, by coming off a Krstic baseline pick and hitting the layup. This sort of offensive diversity is aesthetically pleasing as an alternative to a steady diet of pick and rolls. But it is not particularly efficient. Compared to their season average, CSKA’s production drops by nearly five points per a hundred possessions when Hines plays the four. On the other hand, with the American at center, their offense improves by nearly three points per a a hundred possessions.

Such discrepancies can be attributed to multiple factors: lack of shooting from the power forward position, an overreliance on 1-4 pick and rolls which allow opponents to keep their slow footed centers out of harm’s way and an emphasis on post up actions for Krstic or Kaun, which are unlikely to be the most efficient option in Messina’s playbook – or most playbooks for that matter. But a bigger problem is how underused Hines has been this season. Cold, hard lineup data says that CSKA are an average offensive team with Krstic at center and a proper juggernaut with Hines (or Kaun) at that position, next to a power forward who can shoot (Khryapa, Vorontsevich and even Micov). This is hardly surprising. Even though Hines is undersized, he does not play as a post-modern center. On the contrary, he does most of his damage inside, via putbacks, drives and layups or dunks off the roll.

Simply put, the former Olympiacos center is one of the most versatile threats after he sets a ballscreen. He can connect with the ball handler, clean up the offensive glass (three points per 28 minutes on putbacks last season), or pop out and take bigger opponents off the dribble. What he needs, though, is freedom to get to whichever spot he wants. And nowadays power forwards don’t enjoy that kind of freedom, whether they play inside or outside:

This is Hines in the area of the floor where he is most dangerous. This is also Hines being limited in a specific part of that area. He has to wait and see if the ball handler (Weems in this case) attacks the rim, read the move of the roll man (Krstic) and then do his thing. Perhaps it’s no coincidence that Madrid were able to aggressively trap Weems, forcing a pass to Krstic that was picked up by Sergio Rodriguez.

After the Madrid game Messina remarked that CSKA use a different system than Olympiacos, therefore Hines will have to play a different role. Setting aside lineup data for a minute, those differences are mainly about pace and the lack of a guard with the decision making powers of Spanoulis – Teodosic can’t get to the rim with the same frequency and Pargo is not out of the woods yet. It should also be added that even if Khryapa does get back to doing Khryapa things, Vorontsevich’s defensive inconsistency provides Messina with a pretty good argument for his insistence on Hines as a power forward.

Still, this comes down to a cost-benefit analysis: are CSKA gaining enough from this arrangement to offset the losses from having one of the most dangerous interior players in Europe play out of his range? One of the main benefits from rethinking positions is that each player can maximize its potential by presenting opponents with a set of challenges that they hadn’t been forced to face before. CSKA seem to be reversing this trend, mainly for defensively reasons. But as they heading toward the stretch run of the season, one has to wonder whether they are sacrificing too much flexibility, while also providing their opponents with an obvious help defense point of reference.