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23-0

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(sJacas)

After cruising past Barca in Sunday’s Clasico, Real Madrid are 23 and zero to open the season¹. Average margin of victory? 21.3 points.

Luck, to go along with top-notch quality, is usually a factor in long winning streaks, but Real Madrid’s so-far flawless record is the result of flat-out domination: Dropping offensive ratings of 121.9 (Euroleague) and 117.1² (ACB) points per 100 possessions on opponents while holding them to ratings of 88.9 and 90.5, respectively, on defense, is uncalled for in modern Euroleague/ACB history. Only five games – road wins in Murcia, Gran Canaria, Valencia, Badalona and Milan – finished in single digits.

Easy stops

It is easy to assume Real Madrid’s dominance starts with stops on defense, but there is arguably a hidden context to their rock-solid defensive performance (first in defensive rating in both Euroleague and ACB): Having watched all ten Euroleague matches, five to six ACB encounters and a number of corresponding statements from coaches and players, I would speculate that a bunch of opponents have been sacrificing offensive performance in pursuit of the mysterious “controlling the pace”. I understand the raw theory behind this: slow the game down, take in-control shots when the backcourt is sufficiently covered, keep their shooters out of rhythm. The problem is that offensive output is likely dropping when you are playing out-of-character offense, like Bamberg did in Madrid in week 2. And: Real Madrid are not different from anyone else in that they are playing better offense off stops (steals, defensive rebounds) than dead ball situations. You want to score on them whatever way it is possible – granted, easier said than done – rather than sacrificing quick high-value shots in order to extend possessions.

On defense

The characteristics of defense are rarely as obvious as the offense’s, and Real Madrid are not any different here. There is nothing outrageous about the strategies they apply, but they do have above average athleticism and average player height does not do their length justice. They do have incredibly quick hands; Sergio Rodriguez (3rd), Draper (4th), Rudy (6th), Mirotic (5th) and Slaughter (1st) all feature prominently league-wide in steal percentage on their respective positions. Rudy is probably getting too little credit for his role as on-ball disruptor. Slaughter is very clever stealing post-feeds or poking the ball away from the post-up player. They are 1st in the league, too, in block percentage, with Mirotic and Darden both in the top three on their respective positions.

Slaughter is one of the quickest help-and-recover defenders in the league, and Mejri and even Bourousis are arguably on the mobile end of the spectrum relative to their size.

Potential issues in transition defense have rarely been exposed as opponents, as mentioned appeared intent on running long possessions. Should they ever face a very good transition offense this season – Olympiakos (remember the 2013 Euroleague Final?) and Fenerbahce come to mind – this defense will be truly tested.

On offense

Here on ITG we have been pondering (1, 2, 3) about shot locations, turnovers and all the factors that make a high-quality offense for a while now, and Real Madrid are the closest I’ve witnessed thus far in approaching the ideal offense that produces high-value shots while keeping turnovers to a minimum. They are currently tied for sixth in turnover percentage (ascending) – combined with their league-leading effective field goal percentage (58.9), solid offensive rebounding- and free throw rates, that makes for a good punch.

Among the early trends have been unsuccessful post-ups for Bourousis – the Greek is 1-for-8 on unassisted close range shots (scroll down for his shot chart) – but he’s been adding value by posing an outside stretch five threat. The stretch five is sometimes confusing players and spectators alike to the point where one is left guessing whether opponents are intentionally leaving him open on the pop, or whether they are just overwhelmed by the number of options Real Madrid have.

The threat level reaches scary heights when Real Madrid stop the ball and have Sergio Rodriguez handling the ball on the break. As Serrod is advancing the basketball, Jaycee Carroll is sprinting towards the corner on one wing while Rudy Fernandez is stopping at the extended free throw line on the other. Slaughter, Mejri and Mirotic are always first down the floor in transition. There is a multitude of options for Serrod, who loves to attack early to throw a lob or find shooters on the wing. Real Madrid are 10-for-20 on fastbreak three point shots.

Serrod’s late-clock shot-making

If Nikola Mirotic’s shot making – he’s 18 for 28 from three and 9 for 13 on two point jump shots – is beyond understanding, how about Sergio Rodriguez’s outrageous percentages on difficult shots?

NBA players — there is no league-wide Euroleague data – are shooting 29 percent in average on three point pull-up jump shots. Serrod is shooting 18 for 29. These are shots of high difficulty level.

srod

Collectively grown

The average player peaks at 27 to 28 – 26 to 29³ if you’re looking at an extended period (here and here). Based on Euroleague data, skills such as passing and three point shooting peak later than average (hence, certain types of point guards may peak 30-31 rather than 27-28), while offensive rebounding, shot blocking and drawing shooting fouls peak earlier.

Eight of eleven regular rotation players on Pablo Laso’s roster were born between 1983 and 1987. Only the ultra-talented Nikola Mirotic (1991), late-blooming wing Tremmell Darden (1981) and captain Felipe Reyes (1980) are outside that range. This roster has collectively grown and improved.

Lineup consistency

Laso is the most consistent coach I’ve seen in using five man units, made possible by the roster’s super strong 11-deep rotation and fantastic, stress-free games that rarely demanded hectic substitutions. That’s why the clear patterns in, for example, Jaycee Carroll’s and Dontaye Draper’s minutes.

Last season’s frequent lineup of Llull, Rudy, Suarez, Mirotic and Begic, Laso’s most-used lineup, provided a minus one in 114 minutes, a terrible sign for a top-level Euroleague team. The second unit however, usually featuring Sergio Rodriguez, Jaycee Carroll, Felipe Reyes, Marcus Slaughter and one additional player, regularly ran opponents out of the building. When Laso tore apart his lineups in mid-season – coinciding with the Euroleague Top16 phase – performance dropped.

Suarez and Begic were replaced by Darden and Bourousis during the offseason. In 2013/14, the Real Madrid starting lineup of Llull, Rudy, Darden, Mirotic and Bourousis is plus 38 in 57 minutes. Their second most-used lineup (Draper, Llull, Rudy, Mirotic, Bourousis – the lineup that regularly starts the second half) is plus 39 in 32 minutes. The bench is as productive as ever. You go from occasional second quarter- and regular fourth quarter dominance to regular 40 minutes of dominance. 40 minutes of hell.

More shot charts

draper

llull

carroll

rudy

darden

diez

mirotic

reyes

slaughter

bourousis

mejri

¹ That excludes the SuperCopa
² Using the traditional formula with a 0.44 free throw factor; data from RealGM
³ There is a survivor bias, though

Written by sJacas

January 1st, 2014 at 6:55 pm

  • SST

    Thanks for the wonderful post. I can only imagine how much time it took you to compile the shot charts. The positional steal percentage statistics are stunning.

    Do you have any idea why they are so high? Do you think it was a consideration when the front office was formulating the roster? Is there something with RM’s big men rotations that allow players to gamble more? Something to do with opponents? Coaching?

    All of the above?

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