As some of you may have noticed, this blog has been making an effort to decode the meaning of an ancient cliché in basketball lingo: controlling the pace. We’ve discussed it in both a thick-accented podcast and a detailed account of Madrid’s perfect season.

Last week, Ettore Messina (most likely inspired by our work), joined in the conversation, as part of his breakdown of CSKA Moscow’s defense:

First, it’s paramount that we do not allow fastbreak points. Those occur when you take ill-advised shots or turn the ball over. Conversely, taking good shots within the flow of the offense usually gives you a good chance to grab an offensive rebound or at the very least to get back and set up your defense.

Given the high efficiency of transition plays, Messina’s argument provides a great starting point for the definition of this worn out soundbite: teams control the pace when they minimize transition opportunities for their opponents. At the same time, this very efficiency should also encourage teams to try to dictate the tempo by taking advantage of any openings that may lead to quick buckets. This is where a dilemma presents itself: defensive stops can generate valuable fast break opportunities – the average Euroleague team shoots a lot better in possessions that were preceded by a defensive rebound or a steal. And yet, many coaches (including Messina) are hesitant to fully explore these opportunities. Their reasoning is simple: quick possessions increase the risk for turnovers, which in turn increase transition opportunities for opponents.

One of the problems with the low volume of data regarding turnovers is that it’s hard to test this theory – we simply don’t know whether the percentage of transition plays that lead to a turnover is higher compared to half court possessions (at least I don’t; if you happen to be familiar with a relevant study, drop me a line in the comments section). We do know that some of the most brilliant analytical minds in basketball advocate a higher pace. The Houston Rockets under Daryl Morey are the most obvious example, but their underwhelming defensive performance provides some indications that the aforementioned dilemma should not be attributed entirely to a few risk-averse coaches.

This brings us to Messina’s opponent last week. Most Dusko Vujosevic-coached teams have been notorious for playing at an extremely slow pace that favours their big men. This season has been no exception, as the Belgrade club are third from bottom in possessions per game (CSKA are two spots above them). Partizan have the tools to become a productive transition team. Tarence Kinsey and Bogdan Bogdanovic get a lot of steals and can initiate fast breaks on their own (Kinsey is also a great defensive rebounder). Their big men, especially Joffrey Lauvergne and Nikola Milutinov, run the floor pretty well, providing extra options on the open court. Dragan Milosavljevic is fearless in attacking the rim. However, Partizan entered week 3 of the top 16 with the second-worst efficient field goal percentage in shots attempted off steals. Bogdanovic’s limitations as a finisher in the paint and the season-ending injury of the quick-thinking Leo Westermann have a lot to with this number. Still, Partizan should do better.

For Messina, such struggles must have seemed like a particularly promising sign as CSKA visited Belgrade for the second time this season. Then Partizan scored 16 points on 12 transition plays. Those are defined as possessions preceded by a steal or defensive rebound, which lead to a shot within the first eight seconds of the shot clock (I realize that if those variables are modified, the numbers could tell a different story. But this is a small sample, so we’re looking for indications, not definitive answers). Bogdan Bogdanovic’s explosion in the second half dominated the headlines and a few tough makes by Kinsey made it seem like everything was going Partizan’s way, but the home team had a chance in the end thanks toits earlier success in transition.

Vujosevic saw his players score 12 transition points (on 8 possessions) in a first half that was otherwise the offensive slugfest he must have come to expect. That’s more than a third of Partizan’s total production in the first two quarters. For Messina, CSKA’s issues with transition defense must have served as a red flag. Especially when his players got back but could not set up their defense in time:

Even though Partizan got this running opportunity thanks to a steal, CSKA do well at first to stop the ball and take away an easy pass inside to Milutinov. However, this success comes at a cost, as Partizan have a rare opportunity to take advantage of the weak side. Milos Teodosic is forced to front Milutinov with Andrei Vorontsevich covering his back. Nenad Krstic is trailing the play, keeping an eye on Djordje Gagic. This leaves Bogdanovic open on the right wing. Kinsey finds him and Teodosic jumps out to defend him with little success. Bogdanovic blew right past the CSKA guard en route to an easy lay up, as Vorontsevich could not deter him. However the truly problematic part of this sequence for Messina must be Krstic’s reaction. Like most Partizan’s opponents, CSKA’s half court defense in this game relied on packing the paint. Why should things be any different in transition defense? Why did Krstic stay on the perimeter, close to Gagic – hardly a long range threat – as opposed to helping inside?

In other words, getting back on defense is not simply a matter of defenders running the floor. They also need to be aware of team defense principles even when the formation is altered in transition. On the other hand, the more time you have to figure it out, the easier it is to find the right place. This is why shot selection is such a crucial component of transition defense:

This a typically questionable shot selected by Milos Teodosic – a well-contested three with ten seconds on the clock. The fact that he missed is only part of the problem for CSKA. With Sasha Kaun rolling to the basket, Milutinov defending on the perimeter and Kinsey pushing the ball upcourt off his own defensive rebound, Partizan create two favourable matchups on the other end:

First, Kinsey backs down Teodosic, forcing Vorontsevich to help inside, giving up a wide open Bogdanovic three.The shot misses, but Partizan have back up. Milutinov finds himself matched up inside by Vladimir Micov. He seals him off, grabs the offensive board and slams it home. As Messina put it,

taking good shots (…) usually gives you a good chance (…) at the very least to get back and set up your defense’.

Teodosic proved him right on this possession. Then there is the question of effort:

This is another Partizan steal off a Vitaly Fridzon turnover (he is the CSKA player who’s out of bounds in the screenshot). Teodosic is in the left corner. Milenko Tepic is the Partizan player closest to him. Now here’s what happened a few seconds later:

Not only is Tepic wide open and makes a huge baseline jumper with less than a minute remaining in the game, but Fridzon has outrun Teodosic, even though he took off a couple of meters behind him. This is inexcusable and it didn’t happen only once:

A few minutes earlier, Micov thought that airing his grievances about a non-call to a ref nearby was more important than running back. This left Teodosic as the sole defender on the weak side. Kinsey made the extra pass, leading to a wide open corner three for Milosavljevic:

For Vujosevic, the main takeaway from this game should be that Partizan can afford to pick up the pace with little to no risk involved. After all, they have the second-highest turnover rate among Euroleague teams as it is. For Messina…well, he has already written about it:

Perfect preparation doesn’t exist. What you can do though is push your players and demand from them better and better understanding of the game as well as improvement in their ability to react and adjust.