Here’s the problem with paradigm shifts: they are often associated with too many gray areas to neatly fit an analytical model. Take Euroleague centers. It could be argued that the omnipresence of pick and roll sets in a modern European offense has changed the way the position is played- size is less important than explosiveness and agility, footwork in the post has taken a backseat to defensive footwork. This is why undersized Olympiacos dominated inside against CSKA Moscow in last season’s final four. This is why Stephane Lasme won the Defensive Player of the Year award. This is why every Real Madrid opponent this season secretly hopes that Pablo Laso will keep playing Giannis Bouroussis over Marcus Slaughter (or maybe I’m just prejudiced against Bouroussis).

However, the narrative is not linear. Injuries, chemistry issues and a few good seven – footers have kept the frontcourt traditions alive. This season, CSKA find themselves in one of those gray areas: Nenad Krstic is mostly old-school: he can score with his back to the basket, but lacks the footspeed to properly defend pick and rolls. The only ‘modern’ aspect of his game is his shooting range, which extends to the long two pointer area. Kyle Hines is on the other end of the spectrum. Sasha Kaun is somewhere in between – not as polished on the low post as Krstic, but a much more effective pick and roll defender and a more explosive finisher. When Hines signed with CSKA last summer, there were a few questions about whether Ettore Messina could find enough minutes for all three. The answer was simple: with Viktor Khryapa struggling and Andrei Vorontsevich in and out of the doghouse, Hines, an emblematic figure in Euroleague’s positional revolution, has seen most of his minutes at power forward.The following screencap from their recent game at Madrid suggests that this is not a particularly good idea for CSKA’s offense:

This is a typical issue for any pick and roll offense without a stretch four (or lack of shooting in one of the three perimeter positions): at least one help defender – Mirotic in the instance – can cheat off his man and help inside (also notice Rudy’s aggressive and somewhat risky rotation toward Pargo from the strong side). CSKA have been deploying two-center lineups since last season, so they can run some pretty effective counters, taking advantage of Krstic’s mid-range productivity.

This side pick and roll starts with the Serbian center in the paint. Once Hines rolls to the basket Krstic moves at the free throw line. Reyes stays with him, as he has to honour his jumper. This leaves the two defenders guarding the pick and roll, Rudy and Mirotic in a tough place. If Mirotic hedges out, Hines has a free path to the basket; if Rudy goes under the screen he risks an open three by Vladimir Micov; and if Mirotic stays flat, with Rudy going over the screen, the former could find himself in the middle of a Hines-Micov two-man game. This why Madrid resorts to a switch, with Rudy overplaying Hines:

The only problem is that none of his teammates has his back (perhaps Llull should have rotated deeper, given the distance a potential pass to Fridzon would have to cover). Hines receives the lob pass, is fouled and goes to the free throw line. Another way for CSKA around spacing issues has been mixing pick and rolls with certain principles of the flex offense:

Weems has the ball on the top of the key. Hines is an option as a screen setter, which means that Mirotic can’t roam around. In other words, CSKA are trying a different approach to spreading the floor through their power forward. Fridzon is the one taking advantage of that space, by coming off a Krstic baseline pick and hitting the layup. This sort of offensive diversity is aesthetically pleasing as an alternative to a steady diet of pick and rolls. But it is not particularly efficient. Compared to their season average, CSKA’s production drops by nearly five points per a hundred possessions when Hines plays the four. On the other hand, with the American at center, their offense improves by nearly three points per a a hundred possessions.

Such discrepancies can be attributed to multiple factors: lack of shooting from the power forward position, an overreliance on 1-4 pick and rolls which allow opponents to keep their slow footed centers out of harm’s way and an emphasis on post up actions for Krstic or Kaun, which are unlikely to be the most efficient option in Messina’s playbook – or most playbooks for that matter. But a bigger problem is how underused Hines has been this season. Cold, hard lineup data says that CSKA are an average offensive team with Krstic at center and a proper juggernaut with Hines (or Kaun) at that position, next to a power forward who can shoot (Khryapa, Vorontsevich and even Micov). This is hardly surprising. Even though Hines is undersized, he does not play as a post-modern center. On the contrary, he does most of his damage inside, via putbacks, drives and layups or dunks off the roll.

Simply put, the former Olympiacos center is one of the most versatile threats after he sets a ballscreen. He can connect with the ball handler, clean up the offensive glass (three points per 28 minutes on putbacks last season), or pop out and take bigger opponents off the dribble. What he needs, though, is freedom to get to whichever spot he wants. And nowadays power forwards don’t enjoy that kind of freedom, whether they play inside or outside:

This is Hines in the area of the floor where he is most dangerous. This is also Hines being limited in a specific part of that area. He has to wait and see if the ball handler (Weems in this case) attacks the rim, read the move of the roll man (Krstic) and then do his thing. Perhaps it’s no coincidence that Madrid were able to aggressively trap Weems, forcing a pass to Krstic that was picked up by Sergio Rodriguez.

After the Madrid game Messina remarked that CSKA use a different system than Olympiacos, therefore Hines will have to play a different role. Setting aside lineup data for a minute, those differences are mainly about pace and the lack of a guard with the decision making powers of Spanoulis – Teodosic can’t get to the rim with the same frequency and Pargo is not out of the woods yet. It should also be added that even if Khryapa does get back to doing Khryapa things, Vorontsevich’s defensive inconsistency provides Messina with a pretty good argument for his insistence on Hines as a power forward.

Still, this comes down to a cost-benefit analysis: are CSKA gaining enough from this arrangement to offset the losses from having one of the most dangerous interior players in Europe play out of his range? One of the main benefits from rethinking positions is that each player can maximize its potential by presenting opponents with a set of challenges that they hadn’t been forced to face before. CSKA seem to be reversing this trend, mainly for defensively reasons. But as they heading toward the stretch run of the season, one has to wonder whether they are sacrificing too much flexibility, while also providing their opponents with an obvious help defense point of reference.