(sJacas)

In Thursday’s 111-108 win over Real Madrid, FC Barcelona Regal rode the high pick and roll 44 times to create plenty of open looks from close- and long range. They did so in about the same volume in yesterday’s Copa del Rey semifinal (if you adjust for ten minutes extra time), but Xavi Pascual changed a small but important detail in his pick and roll set up to give Caja Laboral new problems to solve.

I specifically addressed the role of the “4″ in defensive rotations during the Barcelona versus Real Madrid matchup yesterday, but the semi final gave us an additional variation of the high pick and roll, arguably the most important play in modern basketball, to analyse.

The basic setup is still the execution of a pick and roll up in central position, with three players stretching the floor. Three is an odd number of players that have to be placed on two sides of the floor. This creates a double side and a single side.

The quarter final, but for a three-minute opening period, was dominated by pick and roll towards the single side. This gives you the option to choose between the weak side “4″ (again, assuming the “2″ and “3″ are positioned in both corners and the “4″ in the third position) and the weak side “2/3″ to make the initial rotation to delay the roll. Pablo Laso picked his power forwards to make that rotation, which is the common strategy.

In the semifinal, however, 22 of Barça’s 37 high pick and rolls (they also play plenty of side pick and roll, mainly in transition, but that is an entirely new topic) were directed from the single side towards the double side. And that is where the single player who is now the weak side player (see above on the left) needs to come over to challenge the center on his roll to the basket. This allows for even less margin for error for the weak side defender, since there is no second weak side defender to cover up by making a rotation.

Barça’s Pick and Roll heading towards the double side

Barça milked this type of pick and roll offense in the early going, choosing that direction in nine of their first eleven pick and rolls. Additionally, Pascual placed his power forward (Erazem Lorbek or C.J. Wallace) not outside the arc but on the edge of the paint in four of those nine times. This allowed Barça to move the player between single- and double-side on a re-screen, simply because there is only a short distance to cover.

This is what we see in the following sequence, where Lorbek creates a new double side (the left), which Víctor Sada is heading for coming around the ball screen.

If Milko Bjelica (the “4″) was to make a rotation to stop the roll here, the strong side defender from the corner (Fabien Causeur) would have to rotate over to Lorbek, leaving Juan Carlos Navarro wide open in the corner for a single pass and catch-and-shoot. Which is not an option. It is Andrés Nocioni’s turn to come over to cover Ante Tomić on the roll. But Nocioni misses his rotation and Sada flashes a pass to Tomić for the easy two.

In the following play, Nocioni makes the correct read, rotating towards Nathan Jawai to allow Maciej Lampe to recover, before closing out his matchup at the three point line. The Barça power forward is positioned outside the arc here, but that doesn’t change anything about the rotation Nocioni needs to make.

But “right” or “wrong”, if the pick and roll is well-angled and well-spaced, is often a matter of not meters and seconds, but decimeters and deciseconds.

In the following play, Navarro executes a high pick and roll towards the double side with Nathan Jawai. Omar Cook has to make a rotation over, to allow Tibor Pleiß to recover, at the risk of giving Marcelinho Huertas too much space in the corner. Cook probably does so insufficiently, as Navarro finds the Australian for the lay up inside. Jawai is blocked by the recovering Pleiß. This is where a great shot blocker can help, but there was a high risk of conceding the lay up or fouling the shooter.

One of the biggest shots of the game was created through pick and roll towards the double side, when Huertas found Xavi Rabaseda for the open three.

Again, this is extremely difficult to defend when well-executed, and it can be argued that it is specifically Huertas’ jump (faking the defense into believing he is pulling up for a jump shot) that causes Nocioni’s hesitation to rotate back towards the shooter. Huertas is arguably a top five pick and roll passer in the world, so it’s not supposed to be easy.

Caja Laboral: Too little reward for plenty of good offense

I believe Baskonia played a very good game on Saturday, one they could have won if not for, among other factors, a number of surprising misses inside by Lampe. And a little more luck from the outside never hurts: while Barça shot far above average (11 for 16) from beyond the arc, Baskonia went just 8 for 23 on plenty of good looks.

Baskonia, just as Barça, are a pick and roll heavy team, usually going to Thomas Heurtel, Omar Cook or Fabien Causeur (Fernando San Emeterio in limited use) in high pick and roll.

Unlike Barça, Baskonia ran (as is the standard, I guess, – which is why my initial post centered around it – but long-term data is needed to verify this) the majority of their pick and rolls away from the double side/towards the single side. Of 41 high pick and rolls yesterday, 28 were directed towards the single side and 13 towards the double side.

In contrary to Thursday’s quarter final, however, after rotating the power forward over to stop the roll man, Barça in some cases communicated a second rotation on the weak side, where the “2/3″ from the corner rotated over to the power forward to prevent the shot/drive and challenge the immediate extra pass into the corner. The Barça “4″ then has to recover in time not to his man, but to the “2/3″ in the corner. This is a valid option especially when the opponent’s power forward is a long range assassin – like Nemanja Bjelica.

This is what we see in the following sequence: Heurtel runs a high screen and roll with Lampe towards the single side, Wallace rotates over to contain Lampe on the roll, while communicating with Pete Mickeal for Mickeal’s rotation from the corner towards Milko Bjelica. Mickeal is worried about the pass to the corner for the open three point shot and therefore maybe gives Bjelica a bit too open a path into the paint. Bjelica makes a smart play here, sucking in the defense before giving it up to Nocioni for the wide open shot (missed).

In the following play, we see the advantages of Maciej Lampe’s versatility and the confusion it creates. Instead of rolling towards the basket, Lampe pops out towards the three point line after an initial hesitation. When Heurtel (challenged by Sada and Tomić) drives and dishes back out to Lampe, both Lorbek and Sada close out on the Pole, enabling Bjelica to sneak inside for the catch and close range shot. The shot is blocked by Tomić, but this is not a situation Barça want to put him in all too often.

In the following play, C.J. Wallace gets it just about right. Heurtel again runs high screen and roll with Lampe towards the single side, forcing a rotation from Wallace inside. As Heurtel is about to play the pass, Wallace is in position to both deflect the pass to Lampe and close out in time against Milko Bjelica. That is partly because Milko is an able but not deadly three point shooter. Mirza Teletović would have commanded far more respect.

Heurtel shoots a highlight-reel type bullet pass towards Lampe, which Wallace gets a deflection on. The Blaugrana do not win possession, but the play is broken.

Like Teletović, Nemanja Bjelica has range on his jumpshot that goes far beyond NBA range, and that adds a degree of difficulty defending the pick and roll. Here we see him stepping one and a half meters outside the three point line to take – and make – the long range shot.

Barça, however, were not perfect on defense. In the following pick and roll, again conventionally directed towards the single side, Lorbek fails to pick up Maciej Lampe on the roll. Heurtel makes a quality read in flashing the ball to Lampe, who inexplicably fails to finish against the (very weak) last line of defense – Navarro.

Variation, too, in the Baskonia pick and roll

Baskonia, too, showed variation in their pick and roll set up. They ran 13 of their 42 high pick and rolls away from the single side towards the double side, which the Barcelona defense had difficulties dealing with.

In the following play, Rabaseda fails to interrupt the Polish big man on his roll to the basket, which leads to a simple lob and lay up from Causeur to Lampe.

Another of such examples: In a late first half sequence, Tabak positions Bjelica as the single weak side player and runs the pick and roll away from the side.

C.J. Wallace fails to rotate, giving Tibor Pleiß a free roll to the rim. Thomas Heurtel makes a fantastic jump pass to Pleiß on the roll, who is fouled and just barely misses the dunk.

It is not uncommon to see both a double- and single side high pick and roll in the same possession. In the following possession to open the fourth quarter, San Emeterio and Pleiß team up for a high screen and roll towards the single side. San Emeterio drives and dishes the ball to the weak side wing, where Nemanja Bjelica hands the ball off to Omar Cook. Cook and Bjelica do not run side pick/handoff and roll (this is another common option when the ball is swung to the weak side), but Cook, heading towards the double side, uses a second high screen from Pleiß.

Random Notes

Giving the opponent different looks to force different rotations is a large part of why defending the pick and roll is so difficult. Here are elements of the high pick and roll that you may have not just one, but different players perform in, each one with his own distinguished skill set.

• Ballhandlers
• Screeners
• Direction of the ballhandler (double/single side)
• Positioning of the three off-ball players
• Pick and roll set up (screen the screener, let the eventual pick and roll ballhandler come off an off-ball screen and catch in central position, let him dribble of a screen to already force a switch, etc.)

In Europe, it is common to free the eventual pick and roll ballhandler through a series of moves. Teams rarely “just run pick and roll”. Except when it is a transition (side) pick and roll, which also is a major factor these days.

I believe Thomas Heurtel is one of the up-and-coming point guards in European basketball. As I noted on Thursday:

Heurtel is one of the Euroleague’s top shot creators, a metric that combines unassisted field goals (excluding putbacks) and assists and is minute- and tempo-free. Heurtel is back to being a pure pass-first playmaker after registering an uncharacteristic 0.28 assist-to-FGA ratio in the Euroleague last year (ACB: 0.43). The 0.83 (Euroleague) and 1.03 (ACB) he is posting this year are closer to the level of his Pro A years with Pau-Orthez.

Heurtel is a super passer who is making very good reads executing the pick and roll. Fabien Causeur is a “ballhandling two” and a completely different type of decision maker, often putting the ball on the floor and driving hard at the core of the defense. Causeur’s ability to draw fouls is a major plus for Baskonia, who have difficulties getting to the free throw line. The improvement of Heurtel and Causeur, who account for about two thirds of pick and roll ballhandling after the departure of Brad Oleson, has been one of several reasons for the turnaround Baskonia have performed under Zan Tabak.

Whether or not pick and roll strategy was the reason behind Barça wins is hard to quantify and not the point of this post. I feel like “playing off of the defense”, something that Real Madrid are outrageously good at, deserves some extra study, including the transition pick and roll.